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CHARLES R. CALLEROS*
The author posits a contextual analysis of harassing speech in the private
workplace to balance the possible conflicting interests of the First Amendment
with Title VII. Relevant factors include the extent to which (1) an employee has
consented to a vigorous exchange of ideas by accepting a particular job, (2) the
speech tends towards low value speech as contrasted with core political speech,
and (3) the employee is a captive audience. A hostile environment theory of
liability can be applied in a content-neutral manner to speech that is selectively
directed to employees because of their membership in a protected class. More
difficult constitutional questions arise when liability rests on the disparate
impact of undirected speech, because such liability must be based on the
content of the speech.
I. INTRODUCTION: TITLE VII AS A CONTENT-NEUTRAL REGULATION
In a previous article, I argued that Title VII's "hostile environment" theory
of liability-if properly defined and applied-regulates speech and conduct in a
largely content-neutral fashion.' As so defined, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 19642 imposes liability not on the basis of the content of harassing speech,
but on the basis of a harasser's selectively targeting one or more members of a
protected class for harassment.3
* 0 Charles R. Calleros 1996. Professor of Law, Arizona State University. The author
thanks Karen Gillen, Monica Nagelbush, and Marlon Young for their research assistance.
I Charles R. Calleros, Title VII and Free Speech: The First Amendment Is Not Hostile to
a Content-Neutral Hostile Environment Theory, 1996 UTAH L. REv. 227 [hereinafter
Calleros, Title VlW and Free Speech].
2 Title VII makes it "an unlawful employment practice for an employer... to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
3 See Calleros, Title WI and Free Speech, supra note 1, at 252-62. A brief summary of
the analysis begins with Supreme Court dictum that "sexually derogatory 'fighting words,'
among other words, may produce a violation of Title VII's general prohibition against sexual
discrimination in employment practices," a regulation of speech that the Court apparently
would view as incidental to that statute's focus on discriminatory conduct. R.A.V. v. City of
St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 389-90 (1992). This quoted language is best read in conjunction with
later dictum regarding the targeting of victims based on their membership in a protected class:
"[A] prohibition of fighting words that are directed at certain persons or groups... would be
facially valid if it met the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 392; see also
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For example, an employer can violate Title VII if its agent selectively
subjects his female subordinates to unwelcome and seriously disruptive speech
at their work stations, regardless whether the speech conveys sexual
propositions, personal hostility, pro-feminist views, anti-feminist views, or
sports trivia. Because the agent targets only his female employees for such
distraction and allows his male subordinates to work unmolested, the agent
discriminates on the basis of each affected individual's sex, engaging in the kind
of disparate treatment that Title VII is designed to address.4 Moreover, so long
as the agent's unwelcome speech is sufficiently distracting or intimidating that it
makes the subordinate's work substantially more difficult,5 the speech satisfies
the statutory requirement that the discrimination adversely affects "terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment." 6
When the hostile environment theory is defined and applied in such a
Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 482, 490 (1993) (stating that the First Amendment does
not bar an enhanced penalty for battery when the defendant selected his victim on the basis of
race). Thus, the First Amendment might not bar Title VII's selective regulation of sexually
derogatory fighting words if Title VII prohibits such speech not because of the sexual content
of the speech, but because the harasser directs the speech toward a female employee on the
basis of her gender and would not direct such speech toward a male employee.
Properly interpreted and applied, Title VII finds speech and conduct to be intentionally
discriminatory precisely on this basis. See, e.g., Calleros, Title VII and Free Speech, supra
note 1, at 252-61; Charles R. Calleros, The Meaning of "Sex": Homosexual and Bisexual
Harassment Under Title VII, 20 VT. L. REv. 55 (1995) [hereinafter Calleros, Homosexual
and Bisexual Harrassment]. Such discriminatory speech or conduct amounts to unlawful
harassment if, at a minimum, it makes it substantially more difficult for the targeted employee
to perform her job. See Calleros, Title VII and Free Speech, supra note 1, at 258. The
remaining challenge for this Article is to address the constitutionality of Title VII's regulating
discriminatory workplace speech that (1) unlike threats or fighting words, would not be
generally subject to regulation outside the workplace, or (2) is discriminatory only because of
its disparate impact, which necessarily is partly a function of the content of the speech.
4 See Calleros, Title VII and Free Speech, supra note 1, at 257-58 (discussing this
example in greater detail); see also Curde v. Xytel Corp., 912 F. Supp. 335 (N.D. 11. 1995)
(stating in dictum that a work environment may be sexually hostile because of gender-related
discrimination that is not sexual in nature); B.RBARA L!NDEMANN & DAVID D. KADUE,
SEXUAL HARAssMENT IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 174 n.51 (1992) (citing to other cases
recognizing same theory); Suzanne Sangree, Title VII Prohibitions Against Hostile
Environment Sexual Harassment and the First Amendment: No Collision in Sight, 47
RUrcERS L. REv. 461, 493 n.134 (1995) (same).
5 See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
(describing conduct that made it "more difficult to do the job") (quoting Davis v. Monsanto
Chem. Co. 858 F.2d 345, 349 (6th Cir. 1988)); Calleros, Title VII and Free Speech, supra
note 1, at 258 (adding the qualifier "substantially").
6 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
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content-neutral fashion, at least low value speech-such as fighting words or
threats of harm, which are generally subject to regulation in public areas7-can
constitutionally be made the basis for more selective regulation as well. Such a
theory of liability does not selectively regulate a subset of threats or fighting
words on the basis of its content;8 instead, it selectively applies to threats or
fighting words of any content that are discriminatorily directed to persons
because of their membership in a protected class.9
If the hostile environment theory were limited to such low value speech,
however, it would cover only a very narrow range of harassing speech in the
workplace.10 Thus, many victims of harassment will secure redress only if they
can justify greater regulation of speech in the workplace than may be
permissible in public areas of society at large.
If the workplace can be distinguished from such public areas, then the First
Amendment should permit content-neutral regulation under Title VII to reach a
substantial range of "other words" in addition to discriminatorily conveyed
"fighting words." 11 Whether such a distinction should be made, and how great
a distinction is warranted, are matters of continuing debate among
commentators. They question whether a workplace should be viewed as a
forum for "public discourse," what speech that "lies at the heart of democratic
self-governance, and [whose] protection constitutes an important theme of First
Amendment jurisprudence."12
Robert C. Post, a distinguished First Amendment scholar, broadly has
defined "public discourse" as "encompassing the communicative processes
necessary for the formation of public opinion,' 13 but he concludes that speech
7 See, e.g., Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (per curiam) (threats against the
President); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (fighting words); cf
Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile-Environment Harassment and the First
Amendment, 52 Oo ST. L.J. 481, 514 (1991) (interpreting labor law restrictions on election
speech to be constitutional because they are limited to threatening or coercive speech).
8 It was selective, content-oriented regulation of bigoted fighting words that ran afoul of
the First Amendment in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paid, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
9 See Calleros, Title VII and Free Speech, supra note 1, at 245-48, 251-61.
10 See, e.g., KENr GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WoRDs 52 (arguing for revision of
Chaplinsky test because "probably no words now cause the average listener to respond with
violence").
11 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 389 (stating that "sexually derogatory 'fighting words,' among
other words," may violate Title VII).
12 Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous
Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARv. L. REv.
601, 684 (1991) [hereinafter Post, Public Discourse].
13 Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 267, 288 (1990) [hereinafter Post, Racist Speech].
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in the workplace generally fails to meet that standard: "an image of dialogue
among autonomous self-governing citizens would be patently out of place" in
the workplace.' 4 Post also concludes, however, that "there can be no final
account of the boundaries of the domain of public discourse," 15 and he denies
any implication "that all speech within the workplace is excluded from Fublic
discourse." 16
A more aggressive advocate of free speech in the workplace, Kingsley R.
Browne, asserts that "for most citizens-who are not political activists-the
great bulk of their discussion of political and social issues probably occurs in
the home and workplace."'17 Browne argues that the First Amendment thus
generally bars evidence of expression to establish a hostile work environment. 18
Moreover, Post admits the possibility that even "nonpublic" workplace
speech may warrant First Amendment protection "on the basis of constitutional
values other than democratic self-governance"1 9-values such as protection of
the autonomy of individual speakers as they seek self-realization through self-
14 Id. at 289. Professor Post speaks of the "paradox of public discourse," in which both
uninhibited "critical interaction" and more civil "rational deliberation" are necessary for
democratic self-governance. ROBERT C. PosT, CoNsTrurtONAL DOMAiNs 134-50 (1995).
Professor Cynthia Estlund believes that the workplace is at least a limited forum for public
discourse, to which this paradox applies:
The workplace functions ideally as a kind of laboratory of diversity in which the laws of
democratic engagement can be learned and practiced. Because of this unusual
convergence of diversity and close, ongoing, purposive interaction under an
antidiscrimination norm, freedom of expression within the workplace can make a unique
contribution to public discourse.
At the same time, unconstrained speech among coworkers who are forced into
daily proximity could destroy the possibility of constructive engagement.
Cynthia L. Estlund, Freedom of Expression in the Workplace and the Problem of
Discriminatory Harassment, 75 TnIx. L. REv. 687, 694 (1997).
15 Post, Public Discourse, supra note 12, at 683.
16 Post, Racist Speech, supra note 13, at 289 n.112.
17 Browne, supra note 7, at 515; see also Jessica M. Kamer, Political Speech, Sexual
Harassment, and a Captive Audience, 83 CAL. L. Ray. 637, 649 (1995) ("For [many]
people, interchange while on the job may be the only 'political' speech in which they
engage.").
18 See Browne, supra note 7, at 544. Browne concedes that the First Amendment
permits evidence of expression to establish discriminatory motive, but only if the jury is given
a limiting instruction and the court carefully determines under Federal Rule of Evidence 403
whether the evidence should be excluded on the ground that its prejudicial effect exceeds its
probative value. See id. at 545.
19 Post, Racist Speech, supra note 13, at 289 n.113.
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expression. 20 While the possibility of "captive audiences" in the workplace has
commanded attention,21 employees may also be "captive speakers" in the sense
that their forum for self-expression is necessarily confined to their workplace
during a substantial number of hours each week.22 True, most employees must
temper their expectations for autonomous self-expression in the workplace,
because they are subject to their employers' control. 23 Nonetheless, "they
remain at a basic level autonomous citizens, '"24 and both employees and their
employers have been accorded at least limited constitutional protection against
state interference with workplace speech.25
Accordingly, in recognition of the public discourse and attempts at
autonomous self-expression that inevitably find their way to the workplace, this
Article rejects categorical arguments that the First Amendment has no
application to government regulation of speech in private workplaces. On the
other hand, for reasons explored in greater detail below, it also rejects the
simplistic notion that every site within a workplace is indistinguishable from
public areas in society at large. Instead, protection of employees' interests ought
to fall somewhere between the high level of protection of speech in a public
forum and the great protection of privacy in the home.
Moreover, this Article advances an interpretation of Title VII that promotes
both the remedial policies of that statute and the core values of the First
Amendment by limiting the reach of Title VII on the basis of the context in
which allegedly harassing speech occurs in particular workplace settings.26
20 See, e.g., THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6-7
(1970).
21 See, e.g., Kamer, supra note 17, at 678-86 (arguing for qualified extension of captive
audience doctrine to workplace).22 GREENAWALT, supra note 10, at 86.
23 Kamer, supra note 17, at 646-47.
24 Id. at 647.
25 See id. at 650-52 (reviewing limited First Amendment protection in workplaces
recognized by judicial interpretation of labor laws and of the authority of government
employers to control their employees' speech).
26 See Charles R. Calleros, Reconciliation of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties After
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul: Free Speech, Antiharassment Policies, Multicultural Education,
and Political Correctness at Arizona State University, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 1205, 1216 n.44
[hereinafter Calleros, Reconciliation] (summarizing the concept of such contextual approach
in the workplace); Deborah Epstein, Can a "Dumb Ass Woman" Achieve Equality in the
Workplace? Running the Gauntlet of Hostile Environment Harassing Speech, 84 GEo. L.J.
399, 420-29 (1996) (discussing "The Importance of Context"); Nadine Strossen, Regulating
Workplace Sexual Harassment and Upholding the First Amendment-Avoiding a Collision, 37
VML. L. REV. 757, 765-66 (1992) (discussing such a contextual approach); see also R.A.V.
v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 416-32 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring) (describing the
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Such a contextual approach works well in analyzing state regulation of hateful
speech on college campuses, 27 and it may apply nearly as well in the narrower
setting of a workplace. 28
So long as regulation under Title VII is content-neutral and is not justified
on the basis of a desire to suppress speech, First Amendment values should be
satisfied if Title VII's restrictions are reasonably narrowly tailored to serve a
significant or substantial government interest. 29 Part of that standard should be
easily satisfied, assuming that the government's interest in eradicating
Court's First Amendment jurisprudence as one that has flexibly considered a variety of factors
and has appreciated the significance of context).
27 See, e.g., Calleros, Reconciliation, supra note 26, app. B at 1319-33 (describing
guidelines interpreting A.S.U.'s anti-harassment policy which frequently focus on context to
honor First Amendment limitations); James Weinstein, A Constitutional Roadmap to the
Regulation of Campus Hate Speech, 38 WAYNE L. REv. 163 (1991); cf Epstein, supra note
26, at 425-26 (stating that university codes which are not sensitive to context have been struck
down).
Indeed, the Department of Education should revise its guidelines on racial harassment to
make it clearer that standards for a "racially hostile environment" on campus do not apply
well to every forum and context on campus. See Notice, Racial Incidents and Harassment
Against Students at Education Institutions; Investigative Guidance, 59 Fed. Reg. 11448,
11449 (1994). These guidelines are off to a good start by refraining from regulating a merely
"offensive" environment and by addressing at least one example of context: "The effect of a
racial incident in the private and personal environment of an individual's dormitory room may
differ from the effect of the same incident in a student center or dormitory lounge." d.
28 In a previous article, I argued that "[p]roperly limited, the 'hostile environment'
standard may work reasonably well in the workplace in most circumstances," but that it is
"not equally well adapted to the general university context, which often thrives on a vigorous
exchange of views, sometimes in public forums without captive audiences." Calleros,
Reconciliation, supra note 26, at 1216-17. I continue to believe that First Amendment
obstacles to application of the hostile environment theory are much less substantial in the
workplace than in public areas of a college campus. Nonetheless, I conclude in this Article
that the First Amendment does impose some limitations on government regulation of speech
in private workplaces, creating the challenge of describing more precisely those circumstances
in which the hostile environment standard does indeed work reasonably well.
29 See generally Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 796-802 (1989) (stating
that in regulation of time, place, and manner of speech, requirement that regulation be
narrowly tailored does not require a perfect fit, but only one that is not substantially broader
than necessary); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293-94, 298
(1984) (discussing First Amendment standards for regulation of time, place, and manner of
speech and for regulation of conduct that incidentally affects speech); GERALD GUNTH=,
CoNSrrruToNAL LAw 1345-56 (12th ed. 1991) (interpreting Supreme Court case law to
allow flexibility in the requirement that the regulation be narrowly tailored to serve the
governmental interest).
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workplace discrimination is at least substantial, if not compelling. 30
The primary remaining challenge, then, is to identify standards for the
workplace that are reasonably narrowly tailored to the government's interest in
eradicating employment discrimination and that are not justified on the basis of
a desire to suppress unpopular views. This challenge is addressed in Part II of
this Article.
Part III addresses more difficult First Amendment questions that arise when
undirected speech allegedly creates a hostile environment because of its
disparate impact, which in turn arguably is based on the content of the
undirected speech and which requires analysis of the "reasonable person"
standard for evaluating the effect of the speech on workplace conditions.
Finally, Part IV addresses First Amendment objections based on the chilling
effect of vague regulations of workplace speech.
As in the previous article in which I developed the premise of content-
neutrality, 31 I limit the scope of the inquiry in this Article by adopting several
premises and assumptions. First, this Article does not analyze the First
Amendment limitations on a government agency when it acts as an employer to
restrict the speech of its own employees; 32 it addresses only the presumably
more demanding First Amendment restrictions on external government
regulation of speech in workplaces. 33 Second, the illustrations in this Article
30 Title VII prohibits workplace discrimination on the basis of an "individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994). Government has a
compelling interest in addressing race and gender discrimination, and perhaps other kinds of
discrimination addressed by Title VII as well. See, e.g., R.A. V, 505 U.S. at 395 (in case
addressing racial bigotry, stating that the Court did "not doubt" that city had a compelling
interest in securing "the basic human rights of members of groups that have historically been
subjected to discrimination"); Board of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537,
549 (1987) (recognizing that the state has a "compelling interest in eliminating discrimination
against women"); EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477, 488-89 (5th Cir. 1980)
(finding that the government has a compelling interest in "eradicating discrimination in all
forms," such as those forms addressed by Title VII, and "racial discrimination in
particular"); McClure v. Sports and Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844, 853 (Minn. 1985)
(finding a compelling state interest in eliminating discrimination based on "sex, race, marital
status, or religion"). At the least, one may assume that government has a very substantial
interest in eradicating any of the kinds of invidious discrimination addressed by Title VII.
31 Calleros, 7Rtle VII and Free Speech, supra note 1.
32 See, e.g., Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (1994) (addressing doctrine of Connick
v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983) (stating that "[w]hen an employee's expression cannot
be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the
community, government officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices"
without First Amendment concerns).
33 The First Amendment imposes greater limits on statutory restrictions on speech in a
workplace than on a public employer's own voluntary policies designed to promote harmony
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assume that government officials have engaged in state action by attempting to
regulate speech in private workplaces through judicial or administrative
enforcement of Title VII.34 Third, this Article assumes that the employers in its
illustrations are potentially liable under agency theory for the harassing actions
of their supervisors or other employees, perhaps because a harassing supervisor
or manager directly represents the employer or because the employer has
condoned the misconduct of a lower-level employee. 35 Fourth, it adopts the
legal premise that employers who are potentially liable under Title VII for the
harassing speech of their employees have standing to assert the speech interests
of those employees as a constitutional defense. 36
in the workplace. See, e.g., Kamer, supra note 17, at 652 ("If the government as employer
cannot completely regulate speech, how much less power should the government have when it
is operating not as an employer, but simply as a government?"); Sangree, supra note 4, at
508-09.
3 4 See, e.g., GREENAWALT, supra note 10, at 81 (discussing state action in enforcement
of laws that compel private employers to regulate speech of their employees); Sangree, supra
note 4, at 508-09 n. 205 (agreeing with and citing to other commentators that find state action
in enforcement of Title VII).
35 See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 69-73 (1986) (finding that agency
principles apply to the issue of employer liability for the harassing actions of a supervisor);
EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c)-(e) (1996)
(discussing an employer's potential liability for the acts of its supervisory employees,
nonsupervisory employees, or nonemployees). Typically, an employer will be liable for the
actions of a direct representative or alter ego, such as a sole proprietor, managing parmer, or
chief executive officer, or of a victim's nonsupervisory coworkers when the employer has
notice of the actions and fails to respond adequately to them. See Meritor Sav. Bank, 477
U.S. at 69-73; 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e); Calleros, Title VII and Free Speech, supra note 1, at
230 n.14. An employer may be liable for the harassing actions of a supervisor on the same
basis as it would be liable for harassment by a nonsupervisory employee. Additionally, in
some circumstances it may be vicariously liable for the actions of a supervisor, regardless of
actual or constructive notice to the employer. See, e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 111
F.3d 1530 (11th Cir. 1997) (en bane) (limiting such vicarious liability to cases in which the
harassing supervisor is acting within his scope of employment or is aided in his harassment by
the agency relationship with the employer), cert. granted, 66 U.S.L.W. 3157 (U.S. Nov. 14,
1997) (No. 97-282); Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437, 1446-47 (10th Cir. 1997)
(listing four ways in which an employer may be liable under agency principles for the actions
of its supervisor); cf. Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 493-95 (7th Cir.
1997) (holding that employer is strictly liable only for its supervisory employee's quid pro quo
harassment).
36 See, e.g., James H. Fowles, I, Note, Hostile Environments and The First
Amendment: What Now After Harris and St. Paul?, 46 S.C. L. REv. 471, 480-83 (1995). Of
course, if an individual employer, such as a partner or sole proprietor, is held personally
liable for his own harassing speech, he will have standing to assert his own First Amendment
interests. The same would be true for a supervisor or lower-level employee charged with
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This Article acknowledges that many private employers may appropriately
and voluntarily curb the potentially harassing speech of their employees, not in
response to concerns about liability under Title VII, but in furtherance of
company policies designed to enhance the efficiency, productivity, and loyalty
of employees. Although employers, employees, and labor unions may
reasonably disagree about the level of voluntary workplace censorship that
produces the best mix of efficiency, job satisfaction, and workplace justice, 37
that debate does not directly raise First Amendment concerns when it takes
place in a nongovernment workplace. 38 This Article thus addresses only the
problems that arise when government officials threaten an employer with
enforcement of Title VII. 39
II. WORKPLACE SPEECH IN CONTEXT-DIRECTED SPEECH
In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., the Supreme Court identified several
factors relevant to determining whether discriminatory actions create a hostile
work environment: "the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity;
whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive
utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work
performance." 40 A contextual analysis more specifically directed to First
Amendment concerns, however, should expand on these factors and include
additional ones, such as the extent to which (1) participation in a vigorous
exchange of ideas is beyond the employee's job description, (2) the speech
tends toward low value speech, such as threats, rather than toward core political
harassment, provided that the court construed Title VII to impose liability on a harassing
individual who was not also the employer. See generally Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552,
554 n.2 (7th Cir. 1995) (rejecting individual liability for non-employer supervisor, and
reviewing law of other circuits); Ming K. Ayvas, Note, The Circuit Split on Title VII
Personal Supervisor Liability, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 797 (1996).
37 It will be interesting to note whether such matters increasingly become the topic of
collective bargaining or company policy manuals in the coming years.
38 Because private employers are not state actors to whom the First Amendment applies,
they are free to adopt their own policies restricting workplace speech. See, e.g., Sangree,
supra note 4, at 509.
39 The precise line between state action and voluntary private workplace censorship
could be the subject of a separate article. This Article expresses no opinion about the presence
or absence of state action, for example, in an employer's restricting workplace speech in the
absence of threatened enforcement but simply on the advice of legal counsel as a means of
minimizing the risk of future Title VII liability. To squarely raise First Amendment issues,
this Article will assume the presence of some coercive action, or the threat of such action, by
government officials.
40 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993).
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speech, and (3) the target of the speech is an unwilling and captive audience. As
will become evident from the discussion below regarding discriminatorily
directed speech, many of these factors relevant to the First Amendment
constitutional analysis overlap with one another and with the factors identified
in Harris as relevant to the statutory requirement that discrimination adversely
affect or alter the conditions of employment. Part Im discusses how the
constitutional factors take on further significance in the analysis of undirected
expression that allegedly creates a discriminatory work environment through
disparate impact on members of a protected class.
In identifying these factors as relevant to a First Amendment analysis of the
workplace, I am not suggesting that any one of them necessarily acts by itself to
eliminate First Amendment objections to the application of Title VII to speech.
For example, the state interest in protecting captive audiences from intrusive
speech is strongest when the audience is seeking refuge in its own home; once
we leave "the sanctuary of the home," "we are often 'captives' . . . and subject
to objectionable speech."'41 Nonetheless, even adopting the reasonable
assumption that the captive audience doctrine does not apply with full force to
the workplace, 42 the extent to which an employee is unable to escape intrusive
speech except at the cost of losing her job should be a factor that can be
considered along with others in the First Amendment analysis.43
In the same manner, all relevant factors should be considered in the effort
to paint an accurate picture of the setting within which the values of Title VII
and the First Amendment are brought to bear. In applying a test that considers
these factors, close questions should be resolved in favor of protecting speech
and limiting the reach of Title VII, to avoid a "chilling effect" on protected
speech. 44
41 Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728,738 (1970).
42 Compare Eugene Volokh, Comment, Freedom of Speech and Workplace
Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1791, 1832-33 (1992) [hereinafter Volokh, Freedom of
Speech and Workplace Harassment] ("Mhe Court has... never found that employees in the
workplace are 'captive,' and there are good reasons for it not to do so.") with Kamer, supra
note 17, at 678-86 (arguing for qualified extension of captive audience doctrine to
workplace).
43 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 416-32 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (describing the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence as one that has flexibly
considered a variety of factors, appreciating the significance of context); Epstein, supra note
26, at 422-29 (arguing that although the captive audience doctrine may apply with the greatest
force in the home, it should apply to at least limited contexts within the workplace); Kamer,
supra note 17, at 678-86 (arguing for qualified extension of captive audience doctrine to
workplace); Sangree, supra note 4, at 516-17 (citing to cases supporting a flexible application
of the captive audience doctrine outside the home).
44 See, e.g., Calleros, Reconciliation, supra note 26, app. B at 1320 (explaining a
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Current limitations on the hostile environment theory provide some
protective buffer for free speech by excluding merely offensive speech as a
basis for liability45 and by employing an objective test to determine whether
discriminatory actions have so degraded the work environment as to adversely
alter terms or conditions of employment. Although a work environment need
not be "psychologically injurious" to trigger liability, the harassment must be
"sufficiently severe or pervasive" to create "an environment that a reasonable
person would find hostile or abusive," as well as one that the victim
subjectively perceives to be hostile or abusive. 46 Further interplay between Title
VII and the First Amendment can best be explored in relation to the contextual
factors that I have proposed. The first such factor develops a theory of consent
consistent with existing doctrine that harassing speech or conduct cannot create
a discriminatory work environment unless it is "unwelcome." 47
A. Exchange of Ideas as an Element of Job Performance
In some cases, an employee may effectively consent to a vigorous
exchange of provocative expression by accepting a position that requires
campus policy designed to be construed in manner that would avoid chilling effect); Browne,
supra note 7, at 502-03 (arguing that to avoid liability under a vaguely defined hostile
environment theory, careful employers will tend to overregulate the speech of their
employees).
45 "[M]ere utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet which engenders offensive feelings in
an employee' would not affect the conditions of employment to a sufficiently significant
degree to violate Title VII." Meitor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (quoting
Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971)). The Court repeated this limitation in
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).
46 Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22; see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Sexual Harassment,
Content Neutrality, and the First Amendment Dog that Didn't Bark, 1994 S. Cr. REv. 1, 45
(1994) ("In cases alleging purely verbal sexual harassment, the prevailing objective standard
should be viewed, not as a measure of remediable harm, but as a constitutionally mandated
limitation on the statutory prohibition."); see also infra Part 111 (C) (2) (b).
47 Meritor Say. Bank, 477 U.S. at 68; EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of
Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1996). Some kinds of harassment, such as degrading racial
epithets, may be presumed to be unwelcome. See L. Camlle H6bert, Sexual Harassment is
Gender Harassment, 43 U. KAN. L. REv. 565, 588 n.106 (1995). The same presumption
ought to apply to unambiguously degrading or threatening sexual advances. See Calleros, Title
VI and Free Speech, supra note 1, at 237 n.52 and accompanying text. In such cases, the
issue of unwelcomeness need not arise unless the defendant points to evidence that the
plaintiff displayed unusual tolerance or desire for the degrading behavior. In many cases,
however, romantic advances may be made in such form that a test of "unwelcomeness" is
necessary to distinguish consensual social interaction from harassment based on repetition of
uninvited, intrusive behavior.
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participation in, or exposure to, such an exchange. For example, a corporate
marketing executive might be expected to participate in "brainstorming"
sessions in which members of a marketing team discuss such matters as the
extent to which advertising should use sex or ethnicity to sell a product.48 In the
ensuing discussion, the group might single out the marketing executive because
of her membership in a protected class and press her to reveal her perspective:
Susan, I'd like your candid reaction, as a woman, to this footage panning
the prone body of the bikini-clad model. Does it offend you? Is it intimidating?
Or does it make you want to buy our product so that you can be more like the
model?
Conversely, team members might discount the opinion of the marketing
executive because of her membership in a protected class:
I appreciate that Susan is turned off by the shot of the alluring model
stroking the hood of the car. But she's a woman, and our surveys show that
80% of the purchasers of this car are men. I think that they'll react differently.
The female marketing executive, perhaps the first woman to break into the
ranks of the marketing team, might resent the implication that she would
analyze the advertising plan any differently than male team members or
consumers, or that she would have any interest in emulating the model.
Nonetheless, an executive in her position would be expected to field a wide
range of provocative questions and comments and to express her own views
candidly and forcefully, because an uninhibited exchange of opinions is
essential to the success of the marketing program. In this way, the marketing
discussions share some of the qualities of a speaker's forum or classroom on a
college campus, where a robust exchange of ideas is essential to the educational
mission of the campus. 49
Accordingly, a vigorous exchange of ideas relevant to marketing would be
part of the legitimate job description of the marketing executive and would not
be an "unwelcome" intrusion into the working conditions of one who accepted
the position. Any contrary application of Title VII would not be reasonably
tailored to the governmental purpose of eradicating discrimination. Indeed, a
48 See generally Strossen, supra note 26, at 775-77 (analyzing suit against Stroh's
Brewery that alleged, among other things, that an advertising campaign featuring sexy, bldni-
clad models contributed to a sexually hostile work environment).
49 See, e.g., Calleros, Reconciliation, supra note 26, at 1269-82 (academic freedom in
the classroom); Charles R. Calleros, Paternalism, Counterspeech, and Campus Hate-Speech
Codes: A Reply to Delgado and Yun, 27 Amz. ST. L.J. 1249 (1995) (free speech in public
forums on campus).
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statute that shielded the new executive from the full force of legitimate business
discussions arguably would promote an anti-equalitarian notion that she is not
fully capable of tackling the tough issues faced by those who rise to the highest
corporate ranks.50 Moreover, a statute that selectively protected the female
marketing executive from sexually oriented comments or questions about
marketing strategy, and no other expression, would be particularly
objectionable on First Amendment grounds as a form of content or viewpoint
discrimination. 51 This analysis should apply to any position that fundamentally
requires participation in an exchange of ideas or information concerning
provocative topics. 52
Most lower-level employees, however, work in positions that require little
discussion beyond receiving instructions for relatively ministerial tasks and
producing or reporting the results of their work. For example, the job
description of a factory machine mechanic or an office clerical worker would
not normally include participation in broad-ranging political or social
discussions, and such an employee would not be assumed to consent to such
participation by simply accepting such a position. To be sure, any employee
may voluntarily indicate that she welcomes such participation, and she may
even decide that it is in her best professional interest to do so. Nonetheless, a
mechanic or clerical worker who finds such non-job-related discussion to be
disruptive would be free to minimize it by indicating that she does not welcome
it.
For example, suppose a member of the corporate marketing team passed
50 See, e.g., DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass'n, 51 F.3d 591, 593 (5th
Cir. 1995) ("[A] less onerous standard of liability would attempt to insulate women from
everyday insults as if they remained models of Victorian reticence."); Sangree, supra note 4,
at 473-74 (describing argument of an amicus brief filed by the Feminist Anti-Censorship Task
Force); Strossen, supra note 26, at 777-82 (arguing that overly broad restrictions on
workplace sexual harassment do not effectively advance, and could well undermine, gender
equality).
51 See, e.g., Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (holding that a
Chicago city ordinance was unconstitutional for prohibiting some peaceful picketing on the
basis of its subject matter).
52 Another good example is a position in a bookstore requiring its incumbent to answer
questions about all manner of books, some of which may address sensitive topics or express
outrageous views. See Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, supra note
42, at 1853 (expressing concern that harassment laws could apply to expression in such a
context); cf. Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Superior Court, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 187, 195-96
(Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that employee had no claim for wrongful discharge in violation
of state constitutional guarantees of privacy, because she voluntarily accepted a position with a
health center that required her to demonstrate cervical self-examination to female employees
and clients).
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by the desk of a busy word-processor on the way to his office after a marketing
meeting and showed her a photo of a bikini-clad model posing on a car, asking
"How do you react to this image? Here, look at it. I really want your reaction."
Unless the word processor had an unusual job description that included
responding to such queries from the marketing department in addition to
keeping up with a steady flow of typing and related clerical work, persistent
inquiries of that kind could seriously disrupt her work. If the member of the
marketing team targeted the clerical worker for such attention because of her
gender, his actions would be discriminatory. Moreover, if Title VII is correctly
applied to regulate persistent disruptions of any content outside the reasonable
bounds of the employee's job description, whether they relate to sports, politics,
or sexual images, the regulation would not discriminate on the basis of content
of the expression.
True, if the clerical worker enjoyed such discussions and voluntarily
assumed the risk that her participation in such discussions would benefit her
more than would her keeping up with her clerical work, she could welcome the
intrusions, undermining the basis for Title VII regulation and strengthening the
interests in the exchange of these ideas in the workplace. However, such
consent would not be assumed from her acceptance of the clerical position, as it
presumably would be in the case of the marketing executive.
Of course, the same legal standard applies to both employees; the job
description of one of them simply calls for participation in a wider range of
discussion. Indeed, the same standard would apply with a variety of results to
any position with a reasonably well-defined job description.
Even the marketing executive, however, has not consented in advance to
abusive speech or conduct unnecessary to an effective exchange of ideas related
to marketing proposals. Suppose, for example, that a member of the marketing
team treated other male team members with respect but created intolerable
working conditions for the single female member of the team by persistently
and discriminatorily directing hostile and exclusionary epithets to her53 or by
subjecting her to unwelcome sexual advances. 54 Title VII obviously would not
53 As discussed earlier in the text, in addition to being discriminatorily directed on the
basis of membership in a protected class, such hostile speech must be more than merely
offensive to satisfy both statutory and constitutional standards. One can imagine, however, an
intolerable barrage of abuse that could effectively disrupt the female executive's performance
of her work if repeated with sufficient frequency and intensity: "I'm sorry to interrupt, but
we've had enough of your special brand of bullshit. This is what happens when we let the
'bitch' factor into the marketing team. Of course you don't like this marketing concept. A
blimp like you couldn't even fit into the model's bikini. Do us a favor and let us deal with
this."
54 It would be one thing for a member of the marketing team to ask the female
executive's reaction to a sexy advertising campaign and quite another for him to repeatedly
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offend First Amendment values by prohibiting the employer from condoning
such discriminatory behavior.
B. "Low value" Speech and Core Political Speech
In prohibiting discriminatory harassment, Title VII may incidentally
regulate speech across the entire spectrum of speech, from "low value" speech
to "core" speech, including political opinion in the proper circumstances. 55
Nonetheless, consistent with First Amendment values, some kinds of abusive,
disruptive, or intrusive speech may amount to Title VII violations at a lower
level of pervasiveness than others.
For example, a supervisor might create a discriminatory work environment
on a single occasion by discriminatorily subjecting an employee to credible
threats of harm, laced with vicious racial or sexual epithets.56 Especially
because it comes from one who wields power and authority in the workplace, 57
such speech could be sufficiently intimidating-even terrifying-to alter the
make unwelcome requests that she act out the sexual fantasies promoted by the advertising: "I
bet you'd look great in this bikini. How about modeling it for me tonight at my place? I can
picture it now."
55 As succinctly stated by one commentator:
[An exception to Title VII liability ought to be recognized for any speech or
expressive conduct that is "reasonably designed or intended to contribute to reasoned
debate on issues of public concern.".. . On the other hand, prohibitions could be
enforced under this standard ... against individually targeted harassment, even about
political matters, that is so persistent or patently harassing that it could not be reasonably
designed to contribute to reasoned debate.
Fallon, supra note 46, at 47 (quoting from the draft Guidelines Concerning Sexual
Harassment developed by the Harvard Law School Committee on Sexual Harassment
Guidelines, chaired by Professor Fallon); see also Marcy Strauss, Sexist Speech in the
Workplace, 25 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 23-26, 46 (1990); Volokh, Freedom of Speech
and Worlplace Harassment, supra note 42, at 1801-07, 1865-66. Under my approach, for
example, a supervisor might alter the working conditions of a subordinate by imposing his
views about a congressional tax proposal on the subordinate, day after day, for hours each
day, so distracting the subordinate that he fell behind in his work, hurting his chances for
advancement and for pay raises.
56 This is the kind of "psychologically injurious" discriminatory behavior that goes
beyond the minimum necessary to establish a hostile environment under Title VII. See Harris
v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993).
57 Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. e (positing that a superior's position
of authority over a subordinate can enhance the superior's ability to inflict severe emotional
distress on the subordinate).
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employee's terms and conditions of employment on a single occurrence. 58
A supervisor's unwelcome and disruptive imposition of his nonthreatening
political or social views on a busy subordinate, however, normally would affect
the subordinate's working conditions in a less profound manner. If distracting
but unintimidating, such disruptive speech ordinarily would adversely affect
terms and conditions of employment only if it is discriminatorily imposed on a
relatively captive employee59 so repeatedly that the employee's work is made
substantially more difficult. 60
Of course, such an approach at least indirectly treats categories of "low
value" speech, such as threats and fighting words, differently than it does
nonthreatening speech closer to the core of First Amendment values, such as
political opinion or general conversation about current events. However, such
categorical treatment does not offend First Amendment values so long as the
tool of regulation does not discriminate between different incidents of speech
within a category on the basis of their political content. 61 Under a reasonable
reading of R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, for example, government can impose
liability for fighting words in circumstances in which it could not regulate
casual conversation about sports or politics, so long as it does not distinguish
between different fighting words on the basis of their political content. 62
Moreover, under this approach, Title VII distinguishes between categories
of low value speech and speech nearer to the core of First Amendment
protections only by recognizing that some kinds of speech can affect the work
environment more immediately and acutely than others. A harasser who targets
his victims on the basis of their membership in a protected class may use any
kind of speech as a tool to further the discrimination; however, less threatening
or intrusive kinds of speech may alter conditions of employment only if
imposed on a captive listener with relatively great persistence.
In this fashion, Title VII's provisions could be triggered more slowly or
quickly on the basis of subtler distinctions than the difference between
extortionate threats and expressions of political opinion. For example, a
supervisor's unwelcome and disruptive inquiries or comments to an unwilling
subordinate generally will be more intrusive if they relate to such personal and
emotionally charged matters as the subordinate's sexual activities than if they
58 Cy Nadeau v. Rainbow Rugs, Inc., 675 A.2d 973, 975 (Me. 1996) (stating that an
employer could be liable under state anti-discrimination statute for supervisor's unwelcome
verbal romantic advances, which created a hostile environment on a single day).
59 For a discussion of varying degrees of "captive status" in the workplace, see infra
Part HI (C).
60 See supra note 5.
61 See generally R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
62 See id.
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concerned her interests in sports or first-ran movies. Accordingly, using an
objective test, even nonthreatening comments or inquiries that invade a
reasonable subordinate's sense of privacy, such as those relating to her sexual
activities, could alter working conditions at a lesser level of repetition and
pervasiveness than would comments or inquiries about less intrusive matters.63
Similarly, a supervisor's imposition of his political or social views on an
unwilling subordinate would more quickly degrade the working environment if,
rather than arguing her points abstractly, she intrusively referred to the
subordinate's race or other personal characteristics and insisted that those
personal characteristics lie at the root of political or social problems.
Because such an approach simply responds to varying levels of
intrusiveness and invasion of privacy, it does not discriminate on the basis of
content or viewpoint in a way that offends First Amendment values. 64 It should
survive First Amendment scrutiny if liability is based on the discriminatory
targeting of the victim and the objective effect of the harassment on working
conditions, rather than a desire by government to suppress politically unpopular
views.65
C. Captive Audience
The level of intrusiveness of disruptive speech is also a function of the
"captive" status of its audience. As stated in the text before Part H (A), I do not
argue that employees are captives in the workplace in a way that generates the
same interests in privacy and in protection from intrusion as held by residents in
their homes.66 Nonetheless, an employee's inability to escape workplace speech
63 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 26, at 402-08 (describing the tangible harm of sexually
harassing speech and conduct in the workplace).
64 See United States v. J.H.H., 22 F.3d 821, 824-26 (8th Cir. 1994). By selectively
prohibiting threats of violence and intimidation, federal civil rights and fair housing statutes
make content distinctions, if any, that pose "no significant danger of idea or viewpoint
discrimination." Id. at 826 (quoting R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2545); cf Erznoznik v. City of
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 211-12 (1975) (stating that restriction of movies depicting nudity
on drive-in theater screens was not necessary to prevent "significant intrusions on privacy"
because offended viewers could avert their eyes); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21
(1971) (suggesting in dictum that regulation is constitutional if "substantial privacy interests
are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner").
65 Thus, some kinds of distinctions between different forms of speech, though based in
some way on the content of the speech, present "no significant danger of idea or viewpoint
discrimination," because "the nature of the content discrimination is such that there is no
realistic possibility that official suppression of ideas is afoot." R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 378, 390.
6 6 See, e.g., Strossen, supra note 26, at 758-62 (contrasting public and private forums
and summarizing captive audience doctrine).
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except at the cost of neglecting her work and risking her job may contribute to
a discriminatory work environment in a way that can be considered in the
application of Title VII without offending First Amendment values. 67
An employee's "captive" status is strongest when he or she is compelled by
job description to remain at a work station, or to report on demand to the work
station of a supervisor or coworker, and to cooperate with a supervisor or
coworker. If the supervisor or coworker subjects the captive employee to
disruptive, non-work-related speech, the captive employee normally should
make some effort to communicate the unwelcomeness of the interruption and
her need to return to her work.68 If the speaker persists, however, and if the
captive employee has no effective recourse within the organization, she may
have no options except to suffer the distracting speech, quit her job, or engage
in insubordination, retaliation, or noncooperation that could place her position
in jeopardy.
As explained in an earlier example, persistent, unwelcome, and disruptive
speech or conduct in such circumstances can alter working conditions,
regardless of whether it expresses the speaker's interests in sex, sports, movies,
or politics.69 Title VII would regulate such an alteration of working conditions
if the victim of the disruptive behavior was discriminatorily targeted because of
her membership in a protected class. Moreover, the captive status of the
employee can combine with the other factors discussed in these subsections to
keep such regulation within First Amendment limits. At the least, the captive
status of the employee would help answer a specific First Amendment challenge
based on the argument that the employee could have engaged in the equivalent
of "averting her eyes" to objectionable expression in a public space.70
No such response to a First Amendment challenge would be available to an
employee whose duties allowed her to easily avoid disruptive speech directed to
her by a fellow employee. Title VII would be on even less firm constitutional
footing if it sought to regulate speech directed only to willing listeners and
objected to by an employee who is aware of it only because of her own
curiosity.71
For example, some employees might want to privately view Playboy
magazine during their breaks, display militant Black Nationalist posters on the
67 See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 46, at 43-44; Kamer, supra note 17, at 678-88;
Sangree, supra note 4, at 485, 515-20.
68 See Calleros, Title VII and Free Speech, supra note 1, at 236-37.
69 See supra notes 3-9 and accompanying text.
70 See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212 (1975); Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
71 See generally Strauss, supra note 55, at 36-37 (arguing workers bear some
responsibility for avoiding [offensive] speech).
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inside of their personal lockers, or share provocative views with friends over
lunch in the employee cafeteria. So long as employees who might object to such
expression can easily avoid it, they are not captives to the expression in any
constitutionally meaningful sense simply because they must later work in the
same building with the employees who hold views that they find
objectionable. 72 In the case of the private viewing of the Playboy magazine, for
instance, coworkers who learn of this activity may be adamantly opposed to the
sexual objectification of women in such magazines, and they may reasonably
fear that an employee who views pornography during his breaks will be more
inclined to discriminatorily direct sexually harassing speech or conduct toward
female employees once his break is over. However, the First Amendment limits
Title VII to regulating discriminatory actions that may spring from such
thoughts, and not the thoughts themselves.73 If the audience for workplace
speech is limited to those who willingly receive it on their own time, the First
Amendment generally will bar Title VII from regulating the speech on behalf of
coworkers who disagree with the speech and wish that others did not find it
persuasive or entertaining. 74
This analysis should apply even if the employer provides an efficient outlet
for provocative employee speech, so long as the employer provides a forum
that can be limited to voluntary audiences. For example, an employer might
voluntarily adopt a company policy that justifies limitations on expression
72 See generally id. at 47; Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment,
supra note 42, at 1848 (arguing it is "unacceptable" to demand that employers refuse to hire
people who publically hold offensive points of view).
73 See Johnson v. County of Los Angeles Fire Dep't, 865 F. Supp. 1430, 1439-40
(C.D. Cal. 1994) (stating that such regulation of thought is outside the control of Title VII);
see also Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234-35 (1977) (finding that
government may not subject individual beliefs to coercion); cf. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508
U.S. 476, 484-86 (1993) (holding that the enhanced penalty for biased-motivated battery did
not impose unconstitutional burden on personal beliefs).
74 See Johnson, 865 F. Supp. at 1430 (holding that First Amendment barred
enforcement of content-oriented policy of government employer that prohibited firefighter
from privately viewing Playboy magazine during his breaks); GREENAWALT, supra note 10,
at 94 (stating that captive audience analysis does not apply to willing listeners). Of course, the
speech interests of a reader of Playboy or the owner of a poster on the inside door of a locker
would be weaker if he held up the Playboy centerfold or swung the locker door open to reveal
a poster inside every time a member of a particular protected class walked by. C. Andrews
v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1472 (3d Cir. 1990) (involving "evidence of
pornographic pictures of women displayed in the locker room on the inside of a locker which
most often was kept open"). The unwilling listener would be more or less captive in such a
situation depending upon her ability to avoid the display in light of her proximity and other
factors.
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within work areas partly by providing a "free speech" platform adjacent to the
parking lot, available to interested employees during their breaks or before and
after their shifts. So long as other employees can easily avoid this area, or can
walk away when offended by a speaker, the employer should not be liable
under Title VII if some employees use this platform as a foram for outrageous
speech. The employer could be liable if its agent translated the outrageous
speech from the platform into discriminatory conduct in the workplace, but not
simply for providing a forum for consensual dialogue.
In sum, an employee's inability to escape workplace expression is a factor
that can help justify application of Title VII to discriminatory behavior. At the
other extreme, Title VII cannot constitutionally come to the aid of an employee
who complains of thoughts or activities to which he or she is not exposed or can
easily avoid. Between these extremes are cases in which employees are
generally exposed to workplace speech that is not specifically directed at them
and that they need not confront in the same way that they must abide by an
intrusive supervisor. This category of cases raises especially difficult questions
that warrant separate treatment.
ITR. THE SPECIAL CHALLENGES OF UNDIRECTED SPEECH
Professor Eugene Volokh has argued that, even though he interprets Title
VII to regulate speech on the basis of its content and viewpoint,75 and even
though such regulation does not fall within existing First Amendment
exceptions for content-based regulations, a carefully defined claim for
harassment based on speech is justified by balancing First Amendment values
against state interests in eradicating workplace discrimination.76 In his view,
these competing values and interests can be accommodated through a relatively
bright-line test that permits regulation of harassment directed to an individual
but bars regulation of undirected speech.77 Although he does not stress this
point, he appears to define directed harassment not simply as harassment that is
directed to any individual, but as harassment directed to a person because of his
or her membership in a protected class.78 Moreover, he interprets Title VII to
impose liability only if the harassment conveys content related to membership
75 See Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, supra note 42, at 1826,
1828, 1842, 1856.
76 See id. at 1843-46.
77 See id. at 1846-72; see also Strauss, supra note 55, at 44-49 (distinguishing directed
from undirected speech).
78 See Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, supra note 42, at 1846,
1867, 1871.
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in a protected class.79
I agree with Professor Volokh that Title VII requires some form of
selective direction of harassment to members of a protected class, although I
view it as a fundamental statutory requirement stemming from the history and
nature of Title VII, rather than a constitutional limitation on a content-oriented
regulation of speech. Indeed, I would avoid constitutional problems of such
content-orientation by interpreting Title VII to regulate any harassment,
regardless of its subject matter or viewpoint, that is directed at a member of a
protected class and that alters conditions of employment.80
Ironically, my approach permits a more relaxed level of constitutional
scrutiny because it contemplates regulation of a broader range of speech. Title
VII does so by refraining from selectively restricting speech because of its
content or viewpoint,81 except to the extent of recognizing that relatively
intrusive or intimidating forms of speech may affect the work environment
more quickly than others. 82
Because he has assumed the burden of justifying what he interprets to be a
regulation of speech on the basis of its content or viewpoint, Professor Volokh
appropriately defines prohibited harassment cautiously. For example, he argues
that speech is "directed" and thus subject to regulation only if it is "consciously
targeted at an employee, not merely unavoidably within the employee's sight or
hearing." 83 He concedes that this standard may fail to protect employees "from
some rather nasty forms of harassment," 84 but he believes that it represents a
necessary constitutional constraint on the reach of Title VII.
In this way, Professor Volokh's approach departs from more liberal
interpretations of Title VII that would find discriminatory targeting of victims of
harassment on the basis of either (1) the harasser's conscious targeting of a
person because of his or her membership in a protected class, or (2) the
disproportionate impact of harassment on members of a protected class.8 5
Because I proceed on the basis of greater constitutional flexibility stemming
79 See id.
80 See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text.
81 See id.
82 See supra Part II (B). Interestingly, Professor Volokh takes a step toward this
approach by arguing that regulation of undirected speech, which he would not permit, poses
the greatest problems of content-discrimination; however, he admits that his proposal would
still "tolerate viewpoint discrimination for directed speech." Volokh, Freedom of Speech and
Workpkce Harassment, supra note 42, at 1847.
83 Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, supra note 42, at 1868.
84 Id. at 1870.
85 See, e.g., LiNDBLANN & KADUE, supra note 4, at 187-88; Amy Horton, Comment,
Of Supervision, Centerfolds, and Censorship: Sexual Harassment, the First Amendment, and
the Contours of Title VI, 46 U. MLAMi L. REv. 403, 437 (1991).
1997] 1237
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
from my interpretation of Title VII as content-neutral, I am tempted to adopt
this more liberal standard as a means of dealing with some forms of undirected
speech. I cannot do so lightly, however, because a claim of discriminatory
harassment based solely on the impact that workplace expression has on certain
listeners arguably imposes liability solely on the basis of the content of the
expression. 86
These considerations regarding regulation of content of speech come to the
fore in cases at the margin, where harassing messages are arguably directed at
members of a particular protected class, not through personal delivery or
specific language identifying the targets, but because the message arguably has
a disproportionate adverse impact on such members. Before addressing those
troublesome cases, however, useful parameters can be defined by examining
cases with more obvious results.
A. Clearly Directed or Undirected Speech
The extreme cases are easy to analyze under principles outlined in Parts I
and H above. Consider, for example, a supervisory agent of the employer who
allows most of her employees to work in peace but who persistently directs
unwelcome and disruptive non-work-related communications to African-
American employees, solely because of their race, in face-to-face encounters
from which the employees cannot unilaterally withdraw. In engaging in such
clear "directed harassment," the supervisor both selects the employees for
adverse treatment on the basis of their race and subjects the employees to a
particularly immediate, intrusive, and potentially intimidating mode of
expression. 87 Assuming that this adverse treatment substantially interferes with
the employees' work or otherwise alters terms or conditions of employment, the
sharply directed nature of the harassment would both satisfy the statutory test
86 If so, my argument of content-neutrality could be undermined in the following circular
sequence of arguments: liability for harassment is content-neutral because it is based not on
the content of harassing expression but on the selective targeting of victims because of their
membership in a protected class. In turn, content-neutrality gives courts greater constitutional
leeway to define broadly the ways in which victims can be discriminatorily targeted for
exposure to a hostile environment. An overly expansive definition of discriminatory targeting
of victims, however, may rely in some cases on the content of the expression to find the
discrimination. Accordingly, my interpretation of the statutory requirement of selective
targeting of victims must be sensitive to the need to avoid undermining the principle of
content-neutrality.
87 See Fallon, supra note 46, at 42 ("[llndividually targeted, face-to-face speech is
especially likely to have the purpose of being, and to be experienced as, invasive, threatening,
or coercive.") (footnote omitted).
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for prohibited discrimination 88 and help to justify the incidental regulation of the
speech through which the discrimination was accomplished.
89
Title VII should apply similarly to a supervisor who selectively disrupts the
work of women in the workplace by persistently placing pictures of female
nudity under their noses and asking them whether they would look as good
undressed. It ought to apply as well to a supervisor who sends unwelcome
sexual advances via computer e-mail to an employee who is bound by her job
description to read the supervisor's messages and parse them for job-related
information necessary for her to accomplish her assigned tasks. 90
At the other extreme, consider again the employee who reads Playboy
magazine during his break, either at his desk or at some other workplace
location that affords him some degree of privacy. A coworker who happens by
and momentarily glances over his shoulder, either inadvertently or out of
curiosity, might be distressed to see the nude pictorials and to realize that
another employee is spending his break in that manner. Nonetheless, even if the
employer knows of and condones his behavior, unless the employee
mischievously chose a time and place for his break calculated to expose a
member of a particular protected class to objectionable material, his actions do
not satisfy the statutory requirement of discriminating on the basis of a
protected classification. Assuming that he sought to maximize his privacy and
minimize the intrusion of others into his break, he can hardly be said to have
selectively targeted anyone else for harassment. Moreover, regulation of his
activity would substantially burden First Amendment interests, because a
passerby could easily avoid more than momentary exposure to the pictures, and
because any further objection to the employee's use of his break time would be
based on a coworker's disdain for the employee's thoughts and attitude rather
than on any discriminatory behavior directed toward the coworker or others. 91
88 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
89 See, e.g., Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, supra note 42, at
1863 ("Restrictions on directed speech... only prevent people from communicating their
opinions to coworkers who do not want to listen."); Fallon, supra note 46, at 42 ("Narrowly
targeted, face-to-face expression... is less likely to have public or political value than speech
directed to larger audiences.").
90 See generally David K. McGraw, Note, Sexual Harassment in Cyberspace: The
Problem of Unwelcome E-mail, 21 RuTGERs COMPUERa & TEcH. L.J. 491 (1995). Of
course, I do not mean to imply by these examples that the harassment must be sexual in
nature, or otherwise relate in content to membership in the protected class; it is enough that
the victim is singled out for disruptive communications because of her membership in a
protected class. See supra notes 3-9 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, discriminatorily
directed harassment the content of which is sexual in nature is sufficiently intrusive, and
unformnately common, that it provides apt examples.
91 See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
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Although slightly less obvious, interests in freedom of speech and thought
would be similarly implicated in an employee's general posting of non-work-
related expression on an office computer bulletin board or e-mail system, so
long as the expression was posted under a suitable heading, such as "more
sexist jokes," that warned potential readers of its subject matter. A coworker
who sought to avoid the expression would have no employment obligation to
gain access to such a message and could simply delete it.92 Such a coworker
might be distressed to think that the author of the message is composing sexist
jokes and that others may be reading them, but that does not distinguish this
example in any meaningful way from that of the reader of Playboy magazine.
True, in this case the author of the message is making the objectionable
expression available to others, but he has not violated Title VII because he has
not selectively directed the expression to members of a particular protected
class. One might strain to find that the heading "more sexist jokes" conveys a
message of unwelcomeness that is directed particularly to female employees.
However, it would be difficult for a computer user to receive such a message of
unwelcomeness with much force without going beyond the heading,
affirmatively gaining access to the file under the heading, and finding clearer
messages of exclusion within. Moreover, aside from the problem of satisfying
statutory requisites, a statute that sought to regulate such communication would
substantially burden First Amendment interests of willing participants in a
conversation that others would not be forced to overhear. The same analysis
should apply to an oral conversation among willing participants that unwilling
listeners are easily able to avoid once they discern the objectionable content of
the conversation. 93
A different problem is posed by messages visible to all workers, but
unambiguously directed to a person or persons because of their membership in
a protected class. For example, suppose an e-mail heading itself directs a
message selectively to members of a protected class in an immediately
harassing way. The outrageous heading "All Colored Workers get out of JC!"
associated with a file in all e-mail users' mailboxes at JC Co. would not be
directed to employees of color as sharply and exclusively as would the
harassing conduct of the supervisor who singled out such employees for
selective, face-to-face abuse. However, the heading directs an especially
intimidating message of hatred and exclusion to employees of color in
92 See generally McGraw, supra note 90, at 497.
93 In the example in the text, of course, one would hope that an enlightened employer
would voluntarily put a stop to an offensive and wasteful practice of using office time and
office equipment to exchange sexist or racist jokes. "But there is a vast difference between
allowing an employer to restrict workplace speech and allowing the government to do so."
Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Worqplace Harassment, supra note 42, at 1853-54.
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particular, even though the message was delivered to all e-mail users. It does
more than simply identify a file that contains racist jokes or a political argument
for racial segregation; the plain terms of the heading appear to command
employees of color to leave the workplace. True, an e-mail user could quickly
delete the file without ever reading more than the heading. However, the
burden of first reading and having to erase persistent headings or other
messages of that type could eventually alter conditions of employment, at least
for members of the protected class to whom the message is directed. 94
Assuming employer responsibility for the messages, statutory regulation of such
discriminatory treatment would not offend First Amendment values.95
A similar example of directed speech would be a poster displayed in a
common area of the workplace that singles out one or more persons for their
membership in a protected class. 96 Even though such a poster would be
displayed in view of all passersby, rather than selectively thrust before members
of a particular class, its terms might direct its message in a special way to
members of the class. Moreover, the public display of the selectively directed
message would expand the audience, thus increasing the humiliation felt by the
targets of the message and further degrading their working conditions.
Imagine, for example, a crude sketch of a female mechanic with
exaggerated make-up and body curves, posing over the caption: "If you look
like this, you should get out of the shop and into the sack!" If the cartoon
character bore the label "Janice," the name of the only female employee in the
mechanic's shop, the intended target of the expression would be clear.
True, the poster would be up for all to see, and men as well as women
might react with outrage. Nonetheless, its message of exclusion is directed
primarily at the female mechanic, and secondarily to other female employees.
Under an objective interpretation, it tells female employees and Janice in
particular: "As a woman, you are not appreciated or welcome here as an
employee. You're a sex object, and your place is in the bedroom." 97 Assuming
94 Cf McGraw, supra note 90, at 499 (stating that some messages are inevitably read
before they can be deleted).
95 See generally Calleros, Reconciliation, supra note 26, at 1253-55 (analyzing incident
on university campus in which student violated campus policies by placing unwanted Nazi
symbols on the message board of another student, who was compelled to repeatedly erase the
offending messages).
9 6 See, e.g., Sanchez v. City of Miami Beach, 720 F. Supp. 974, 977 n.9 (S.D. Fla.
1989) (pictures from Playboy, Penthouse, and other publications posted in the police station);
Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 589 F. Supp. 780, 782-83 (E.D. Wise. 1984) (pictures and
captions depicting a naked woman with employee's initials on it); Kyriazi v. Western Elec.
Co., 461 F. Supp. 894, 934 (D.N.J. 1978) (caricature of identifiable employee).
97 According to one commentator, typical workplace pornography that is coupled with
references to particular employees is intended to portray the targeted employees as "castrator,
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that the employer is responsible for this and similar posters under agency
principles, prolonged and pervasive display of such a selectively directed
message could again trigger liability under Title VII without offending First
Amendment values.
B. Cases at the Margin
But what of a generally displayed poster that does not use language to
direct a hostile message to members of a particular protected class? The most
common example is a calendar or other pin-up picturing a nude or scantily clad
woman, sometimes in a sexually suggestive or submissive pose. 98 These cases
potentially pose the greatest difficulty for those seeking to draw a principled line
between directed and undirected speech, for purposes both of satisfying the
statutory requirement of discriminatory targeting and giving due constitutional
consideration to speech interests.
If the display of such posters is combined with remarks or other
circumstances relating the posters to particular women in the workplace because
of their gender, they may be directed to those women just as surely as though
their names were inscribed on the posters.99 In the absence of such
whore, and dyke." Dorchen Leidholdt, Pornography in the Workplace: Sexual Harassment
Litigation Under Title VII, in T PRICE WE PAY 216, 217 (Laura J. Lederer & Richard
Delgado, eds., 1995).
Shortly before this Article went to print, a federal jury awarded damages to a female
airline pilot against Continental Airlines for its condoning, among other things, male pilots'
practice of leaving pornography in the female pilot's cockpit, some of which had her name
scrawled on it. See Continental Pilot Wins Award in Sex-Bias Case Workplace, L.A. TiMES,
Oct. 17, 1997, at D6 (reporting jury verdict of Oct. 16, 1997 and allegations that male pilots
wrote female pilot's name on graphic photos); see also Blakely v. Continental, Civ. No. 93-
2194 (WGB), 1995 Westlaw 464477, at *1 (D. N. J. June 16, 1995) (referring, in denial of
motion to dismiss, to allegation that pornographic materials left in female pilot's cockpit
eventually "contained handwritten comments directed specifically towards" her).
98 See, e.g., Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1495-98
(M.D. Fla. 1991); Stair v. LeHigh Valley Carpenters Local Union No. 600, 62 Empl. Prac.
Dec. (CCH) 42,602 at 77,251, 42,602 at 77,267 (E.D. Pa. June 28, 1993).
99 See Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1496 (discussing a blonde, female employee who
worked with a welding tool known as a "whip" and who felt "particularly targeted" when a
coworker waved around a picture of a nude blonde woman in high heels and a whip); cf.
Fallon, supra note 46, at 42 (stating that "[the forced, ongoing intimacy of the workplace"
can create associations between anonymous posters and the physical presence of harassers).
Indeed, even if a coworker displayed the poster with no such intention to direct it to members
of a particular protected class, such targeting might occur if a supervisor, hearing of
complaints from such members, encouraged continued display of the poster for the specific
purpose of driving members of that class from the workplace. See generally LIzEmANN &
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circumstances, however, a male employee might display a nude female pin-up
simply because he enjoys viewing it during the course of his work and not
because he wishes to direct its message to anyone else. 100
That such gender roles may occasionally be reversed is illustrated by the
experience of my brother-in-law, who in 1992 was employed as a library
assistant in the cataloguing department of the main library of a public
university. At that time he was the only male among more than a dozen
employees in the department, which was separated from view of the public
rooms of the library. When he asked where he could find paper for the copy
machine, a senior female employee smirked slightly and pointed to a cabinet
below the sink. He soon discovered that the inside of the cabinet was lined with
pictures of male nudes, with a bit of Velcro covering the genitalia of the only
one depicting full frontal nudity. Although on further reflection he realized that
one or more of his coworkers was simply following the example of men who
have frequently displayed pictures of female nudity in other workplaces, he
admits that he was initially taken aback. He was momentarily offended by the
photos, which he viewed as inappropriate to the workplace. 101
Had the owner of the pictures posted them shortly after my brother-in-law's
arrival, and had she drawn a depiction of a knife or pair of scissors next to the
genitals of the frontal nude, rather than covering it up, the pictures could have
been interpreted as a symbolic "castration" threat directed to him because of his
gender: "We've gotten along fine in this department for years without men;
stay in your place or we'll make you miserable and professionally impotent in
this department." Similarly, the first female employee in the mechanic's shop
might derive an analogous symbolic "rape" message from a newly posted
picture of a women in a sexually submissive position: "We will continue to
dominate this shop; stay in your place or we'll put you in your place."
However, the pictures in the library cataloguing department were not
explicitly or by circumstances directed to my brother-in-law. They obviously
were displayed for the entertainment of one or more female employees: they
predated the arrival of the first male employee, they were posted in a place
designed to keep them from the view of employees outside the originally all-
female department, and no one directed my brother-in-law's attention to them
until he asked about the location of copy paper. Similarly, assuming that male
employees sometimes post pictures of nude females solely for their own
KADUE, supra note 4, at 187-88.
100 1 thus reject as overinclusive the dictum of one court that "intent to discriminate on
the basis of sex in cases involving... pornographic materials... thus should be recognized
as a matter of course." Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 n.3 (3d Cir.
1990).
101 Conversation with Christopher G. Driggs in Verdi, Nevada, July 1995.
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entertainment while they work and not for any other reason, some kinds of
generally posted pornography or other expression simply are not consciously
directed toward other employees because of their membership in a protected
class.
In such a case, the pin-up is displayed on substantially equal terms to
anyone passing by. If so, the only theory on which to rest statutory liability
would be the possible disparate impact of the display. Under that theory, a
facially neutral policy may discriminate on the basis of a protected class if it has
a disproportionate, adverse impact on members of that class and is not
supported by a job-related business necessity.10 2
Disparate impact analysis is most easily applied to barriers to entry, such as
entrance exams or height and weight requirements that disproportionately
exclude members of a protected class from even gaining access to a position.' 03
In such cases, the impact of a challenged policy is unlawfully disparate if "the
challenged practice excludes members of a protected group in numbers
disproportionate to their incidence in the pool of potential employees." 10 4 By
analogy, as applied to conditions of employment, an unlawful disparate impact
would be established if nondirected workplace expression for which the
employer is responsible alters working conditions for members of a protected
class in numbers disproportionate to their numbers in the total workforce that is
102 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1) (1994); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971) (providing a judicial precursor to specific statutory provision regarding disparate
impact). Under the statutory provision most relevant to this analysis:
An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is established under this title
only if-
(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular
employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged
practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with business
necessity ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (1994).
103 See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 323-32 (1977) (height and weight
requirement for prison guards); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 427-28 (high school diploma or
intelligence test as a condition of employment); Blake v. City of Los Angeles Police Dep't,
595 F.2d 1367, 1371 (9th Cir. 1979) (height requirment and physical abilities test for police
officers).
104 New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 598 (1979) (White, J.,
dissenting); see also Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 (1977) ("[A]
proper comparison was between the racial composition of Hazelwood's teaching staff and the
racial composition of the qualified public school teacher population in the relevant labor
market.").
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exposed to the expression.
One might argue that a provocative display, such as one depicting female
nudity, will rarely satisfy the statutory standard of disproportionately affecting
members of a particular protected class in any substantial way. Conceivably,
each passerby will react to such a poster with pleasure, disinterest, or disdain
on the basis of his or her personal values and proclivities regarding public
nudity or sexuality and with minimal correlation to his or her gender, race,
religion, or other protected status. 105 If so, the poster fails to satisfy the
statutory requisites for liability, because no one has either consciously targeted
members of a particular protected class for adverse treatment or taken action
that has such an effect. Adverse reactions in the workplace may lower morale
generally, but only in a way that is broadly distributed among employees,
cutting across gender, racial, religious, and other lines. Indeed, the argument
goes, any assumption that the work of female employees will be affected
disproportionately and adversely by such displays reflects a paternalistic view
that women are fragile and must be protected in the workplace from displays
and attitudes that pervade our society outside the workplace. 106
Many courts and commentators have argued, however, that pornography,
even if dispersed generally in the workplace, frequently singles out women in
the workplace for adverse treatment because it affects them differently, or at
105 Interestingly, as I prepare my first draft of this Article, a published letter to the
advice columnist Abigail Van Buren supports this argument with respect to gender but may
undermine it with respect to religion:
Dear Abby:
My husband works for the city in a 24-hour plant that is manned by all males in a
situation where work space is shared by all. Some of the men have taken the liberty of
hanging calendars that feature scantily clad or partially nude young women. My husband
finds this very offensive and against his religious beliefs, as do I. One of the other men
has the same values, and he took one of the calendars down and threw it away....
Abigail Van Buren, Girlie Calendars Offend Man's Wfe, Cmu. TRm., July 20, 1996, at 27;
see also Lambert v. Condor Mfg., Inc., 768 F. Supp. 600, 602 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (nling
that Title VII required employer to accommodate religious beliefs of male employee by
ordering coworkers to remove photos of nude women from the workplace).
106 See, e.g., Strossen, supra note 26, at 778-79 (noting that such protectionist views
'reinforce a patronizing, paternalistic view of women's sexuality that is inconsistent with
women's full equality"); Horton, supra note 85, at 444-47 (summarizing arguments that
women do not uniformly view sexual images in the workplace as harmful to them and that
stereotyped perceptions of such harm will encourage exclusionary and paternalistic policies).
1997]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
least more strongly, than it does men. For example, although my brother-in-law
was temporarily disturbed by the pictures of nude males in his workplace, he
did not feel any threat of sexual assault from the female owner of the pictures.
In contrast, one court has noted that "women are disproportionately victims of
rape and sexual assault" and therefore "have a stronger incentive to be
concerned with sexual behavior." 10 7 Accordingly, "[a]lthough men may find
[pornography] harmless and innocent, it is highly possible that women may feel
otherwise. " 108
These considerations presumably apply with particular force if the
pornography is limited to depicting women as sexual objects. However, some
argue that even sexual expression that depicts both men and women in sexual
situations or as sex objects operates primarily to the detriment of women in the
workplace: "The sexual aspect of the male sex role does not interfere with the
perception of men as serious, professional workers"; however, a "woman
cannot be an analytical, rational leader and a sex object at the same time." 109
Conversely, some kinds of undirected sexual expression might be
disproportionately intimidating or disturbing to male employees, perhaps
because it questions male sexual prowess," 0 challenges their sexual identity,"'
107 Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991); cf. Jordan v. Gardner, 986
F.2d 1521, 1525-26 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (noting that for purposes of determining
whether body searches of female inmates by male guards violate the Eighth Amendment,
women, particularly those who have been sexually abused, suffer more than do men from
unwanted cross-gender touching).
108 Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1486 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing Note,
Sexual Harassment Claims ofAbusive Work Environment Under itle VII, 97 HARv. L. REv.
1449, 1451 (1984)).
109 Barbara A. Gutek, SEx AND Thm WORKPLACE 166-67 (1985). According to another
commentator: "The underlying message [of workplace pornography) is the same: women
are not self-determining human beings, the equals of men, but instead are sexual objects who
are, by their very nature, unconditionally available for any sexual treatment men choose to
impose on them." Leidholt, supra note 97, at 229.
110 See, e.g., Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1334, 1335, 1337 (D.
Wyo. 1993) (apparently finding that a supervisor verbally abused men not by suggesting any
inclination to have sexual relations with them, but by boasting of his own sexual prowess and
denigrating theirs). Even though such conduct theoretically could be equally denigrating to
men as sexual advances are to women, each could still be viewed separately as discrimination
on the basis of gender if they constituted different kinds of adverse treatment. See id. at 1337;
Calleros, Homosexual and Bisexual Harassment, supra note 3, at 70-77.
111 See generally Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1504
(M.D. Fla. 1991) (discussing expert testimony that about half the men in a study and in the
general population "are oriented to their masculinity and their sexuality as an important part
of their self-concept").
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or otherwise triggers male homophobia.112
In many cases, the particularly strong impact of sexualization of the
workplace on women may be explained partly by the low number of female
employees in relation to male coworkers and supervisors. If the gender
imbalance is severe, those in the minority may "capture the attention of the
members of the majority group, providing fodder for their rumors and
constantly receiving their scrutiny," and making those in the minority "far more
likely to become the victim of stereotyping than a member of the majority
group."" 3 Perhaps this phenomenon partly explains the initial discomfort my
brother-in-law felt as the only male in a department among female coworkers
and superiors who displayed pictures of nude males in their supply cabinet. In a
similar manner, a severe imbalance in the workforce corresponding to other
protected classifications, such as race, could increase the impact of allegedly
harassing, though undirected speech.
As I have summarized them above, the arguments in this debate may serve
to outline some of the factual issues that can be explored in a disparate impact
analysis that focuses on a particular workforce. They are less enlightening,
however, to the extent that they are invoked to categorically apply or exclude
disparate impact analysis with abstract formulations of perceived universal
truths.
In my view, a majority of a three-member panel of the Ninth Circuit
committed an analogous error in DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone and Telegraph
Co., Inc., concluding that disparate impact analysis was not available to
employees who sought to show that an employer's policy against homosexuals
had an unlawfully disparate impact on men and thus constituted gender
discrimination." 4 Rather than rejecting the claim of disparate impact on the
facts, the majority found the theory to be inapplicable on the ground that it
represented an "artifice to 'bootstrap'" an unprotected classification, sexual
orientation, into the protection of Title VII." 5 In contrast, Judge Sneed
112 See, e.g., id. at 1494 (discussing a male employee's response that "he would think
the 'son of a bitch' to be 'queer'" if a vendor offered him a pin-up of a nude male); Fox v.
Sierra Dev. Co., 876 F. Supp. 1169, 1174-75 nn. 5-6 (D. Nev. 1995).
113 See Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. at 1503 (discussing expert testimony
regarding worllaces in which "an individual's group comprises fifteen to twenty percent or
less of the work force in the relevant work environment").
114 608 F.2d 327, 330-31 (9th Cir. 1979).
115 Id. at 330. As I explained in a previous article:
The majority may have been unduly influenced... by a subconscious reaction to
social controversy surrounding gay and lesbian rights. After all, the courts have had no
trouble recognizing sex discrimination in the height and weight requirements, even
though Title VII does not directly prohibit discrimination on the basis of height or
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observed in partial dissent-correctly in my view-that the disparate impact
theory was theoretically available to support such a claim; the plaintiffs' main
obstacle was in establishing the unlikely factual basis for such a claim. 116
Similarly, reserving constitutional objections for the moment, no principle of
statutory policy or construction justifies categorically rejecting disparate impact
theory as a means of establishing the unlawfully discriminatory effect of
generally displayed posters.
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,11 7 the Supreme Court first explained the
justification for applying a disparate impact analysis to facially neutral policies
that operated to disqualify in disproportionately high numbers African-
American applicants for jobs formerly filled only by white employees:
The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII... was to
achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have
operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over
other employees. Under the Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their
face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate
to "freeze" the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices. 118
Although an allegedly racist or sexist poster may not exclude members of a
protected class as starkly as do entrance requirements, it could prevent those
who make inroads on formerly white-male workplaces from enjoying an equal
weight. They did not regard it as "bootstrapping" to recognize that minimum height and
weight requirements could unlawfully burden female applicants disproportionately.
Calleros, Homosexual and Bisexual Harassment, supra note 3, at 60 (citing to Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 323-32 (1977) (height and weight requirement for prison guards);
see also Blake v. City of Los Angeles Police Dep't, 595 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1979) (height
and physical abilities test for police officers).
116 DeSandis, 608 F.2d at 333-34 (Sneed, J., dissenting). As my previous article
explains:
For example, if half of an employer's work force were male and most of those
male employees were known to the employer to be gay, and if only a small percentage
of the female employees were known to the employer to be lesbian, a policy against all
identifiable homosexual employees, though otherwise neutral on its face, could
disproportionately burden male employees. In this hypothetical, the employer might
target sixty percent of the male workforce for discharge while targeting only ten percent
of the female workforce.
Calleros, Homosexual and Bisexual Harassment, supra note 3, at 59.
117 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
118 Id. at 429-30.
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opportunity to perform their work capably or even to survive the pressures of
the workplace." 9 Moreover, when Congress codified the disparate impact
theory in the Civil Rights Act of 1991120 in response to Supreme Court case
law restricting application of the theory, 121 it defined the unlawful practice
broadly as "a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact" on
the basis of a protected classification and is not justified by job-related business
necessity. 122 So long as the employer is responsible for expression under
agency principles, 123 egregiously disturbing or distracting expression could
constitute "a particular employment practice." As in DeSantis, the main
obstacle to relief ought to be in establishing the disparate impact as a factual
matter124 rather than in confirming disparate impact analysis as a generally
available theory of relief.
On the other hand, Title VII liability based solely on the disparate impact of
pure speech raises more serious First Amendment concerns than does liability
119 See, e.g., Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 955 F.2d 559, 560-61 (8th Cir.
1992) (employee quit); Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1519-20
(1991) (employee missed approximately 140 days of work in five years).
120 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
121 137 CoNG. REC. S15273, 15276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991).
122 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (1994).
123 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
124 Under Title VII, the disparity in impact must be significant to trigger liability. The
Code of Federal Regulations describes the necessary level of impact as follows:
"A selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less than four-fifths
(4/5) (or eighty percent) of the rate for the group with the highest rate will generally be
regarded by the Federal enforcement agencies as evidence of adverse impact, while a
greater than four-fifths rate will generally not be regarded by Federal enforcement
agencies as evidence of adverse impact."
29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (1996); see also, e.g., New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440
U.S. 568, 598-99 (1979) (White, J., dissenting) (stating that plaintiffs "made out a sufficient,
though not strong prima facie case" with evidence tending to show that "blacks and Hispanics
suffer three times as much from the operation of the challenged [employer policy] as one
would expect from a neutral practice"); Frazier v. Garrison I.S.D., 980 F.2d 1514, 1524 (5th
Cir. 1993) (asserting that 4.5 percentage points difference between minority and nonminority
pass rates reflected "no significant statistical discrepancy"); Association of Mexican-
American Educators v. California, 927 F. Supp. 1397, 1407 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (applying 4/5
rule). In a case in which 3.7% of recently hired teachers were African-American, a charge of
illegal pattern or practice of discrimination may be reinforced by proof that 15.4% of
qualified teachers in the labor pool were African-American, but might be weakened by proof
that only 5.7 % of qualified teachers in the labor pool were African-American. See Hazelwood
Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 310 (1977).
12491997]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
for harassing speech that is specifically directed to employees because of their
membership in a protected class. Such a disparate impact theory of liability
could be content-neutral at a general level, in the sense that it could apply to a
full range of expression and variety of viewpoints; however, the conclusion of
discrimination is inescapably based on the content of the expression to the
extent that it relies on the disparate primary effect of the expression on viewers
or listeners, rather than on the speaker's act of selectively targeting members of
a protected class. 125 Accordingly, if such a theory of liability is recognized at
all, its content-orientation should be recognized as well and its reach
accordingly circumscribed.
C. Free Speech and Disparate Impact
In cases in which the purveyor of allegedly harassing speech has
specifically targeted members of a protected class for selective reception of the
speech, I have argued in this Article and its predecessor that a content-neutral
regulation of such discriminatory targeting is consistent with First Amendment
values. However, when not only the alteration of conditions of employment,
but also the discriminatory nature of undirected expression spring from its
impact on viewers rather than on selective reception of the expression, the
content of the expression necessarily plays a greater role in the regulation,
placing the content-neutrality of the regulation in doubt. Thus, the First
Amendment implications of such a disparate impact theory should begin with an
analysis of the extent to which it would regulate speech on the basis of content
or viewpoint.
This threshold issue of content-neutrality is explored in Part M (C) (1)
below. Part II (C) (2) examines necessary limitations on application of a
disparate impact theory to protect First Amendment values.
1. Disparate Impact and Content-Neutrality
If Title VII is interpreted and applied in the manner that I have
advocated, 126 hostile environment liability based on the disparate impact of
expression would not discriminate against workplace expression on the basis of
its viewpoint. For example, such a theory of liability would not operate to
regulate anti-feminist and white supremacist expression while leaving anti-male
or intimidating Latino militant expression unregulated. Instead, it would stand
125 See, e.g., Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, supra note 42, at
1847 (excluding Title VII regulation of undirected speech would avoid or minimize content-
discrimination and viewpoint-discrimination).126 See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text.
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ready to regulate any perspective that selectively degraded the conditions of
employment of members of a protected class through its disparate impact. It
might be a rare case in which a workplace is dominated by women whose
expression has a selectively adverse impact on male coworkers. However, Title
VII would stand ready to apply to such a case, and the experience of my
brother-in-law 127 suggests that such a case is not purely hypothetical.
On the other hand, regulation based on disparate impact would not be as
indifferent to general content as would regulation of harassing speech that is
specifically directed to one or more persons because of their membership in a
protected class. In the latter case, First Amendment concerns are minimized
because discrimination is found in the harasser's selective targeting of his
victims rather than in the content of his expression. 28 In such a case, the
content of the speech is unimportant to Title VII's theory of regulation. The
unlawful speech could address anything from sports or the arts to politics or
sexual relations, so long as it sufficiently distracted or disturbed the targeted
employee to make it substantially more difficult for her to perform her work. 129
In contrast, when expression is not selectively directed to members of a
protected class but is found to be discriminatory only because of the impact of
its message, regulation on that basis necessarily has a stronger relationship to
the content of the expression. True, at a general level, such a theory of liability
will apply broadly to any form of expression, ranging from displays of
pornographic materials 130 to the style in which a manager gives direction or
provides criticism, 131 so long as it disproportionately alters conditions of
employment for members of a protected class despite the absence of a
conscious intention to do so. Nonetheless, compared to regulation of selectively
directed speech, regulation based on disparate impact cannot be said to be
127 See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
128 See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 480, 490 (1993) (positing that the First
Amendment does not bar an enhanced penalty for battery when the defendant selected his
victim on the basis of race); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392 (1992) (stating in
dictum that a "prohibition of fighting words that are directed at certain persons or
groups... would be facially valid if it met the requirements of the Equal Protection
Clause").
129 See Calleros, Title VII and Free Speech, supra note 1, at 257-59.
130 See, e.g., Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1523 (M.D.
Fla. 1991) ("The pictures... did not originate with the intent of offending women in the
workplace ... but clearly [have] a disproportionately demeaning impact on the
women....").
131 See Cross v. Alabama, 49 F.3d 1490, 1504-05 (11th Cir. 1995) (finding that in a
hostile environment case, the district court properly questioned whether the supervisor's style,
although directed in equal terms to male and female subordinates, may have been more
offensive to female than to male employees).
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indifferent to whether harassing speech addresses sports, movies, politics, or
racial and sexual relations.
For example, suppose that an agent for the employer 132 uses his authority
to impose his views about politics, religion, and popular culture selectively on
female subordinates, distracting them from their work and causing them to fall
behind their male counterparts in productivity and earnings. Although the
content of the agent's expression might affect the rapidity with which his
unwelcome expression degrades the work environment of the female
employees, 133 as long as the expression had the requisite effect on conditions of
employment, Title VII's regulation of the agent's discriminatory conduct should
be otherwise indifferent to the content of his expression. 134
In contrast, suppose that a supervisor or coworker for whose actions the
employer is responsible displays posters in a common area of the workplace,
not intending to direct the expression to any other person or group, but simply
displaying ideas for his own consumption and for that of any other employee
who cares to take notice. Because Title VII is concerned only with
discriminatory speech or conduct, 135 it simply would not apply to the
undirected display of posters in the absence of a disparate impact on members
of a protected class. Moreover, assuming that employees of all classes have
general access to the posters, 136 any disparate impact necessarily must be based
on the content of the posters.
For example, suppose the posters displayed the agent's favorite stars in the
National Basketball Association: Michael Jordan, Charles Barkley, and
Shaquille O'Neil. Although all the depicted stars are African-American, it is
unlikely in the extreme that employees would find the posters to be
differentially distracting according to the race of the viewers. Similarly,
although some might speculate that such depictions of sports stars would
benignly distract men to a greater degree than women, such speculation would
be based on outdated stereotypes that are belied by the substantial number of
female fans who attend NBA games. 137
132 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
133 See supra Part II (B).
134 See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text.
135 See Calleros, Homosexual and Bisexual Harassment, supra note 3, at 70-77.
136 If the posters were displayed immediately outside the women's restroom, they might
have a disparate impact on female employees simply because they likely would be viewed
more frequently by female employees even though all employees would have general access
to them. On the other hand, one probably could infer that posters displayed in such a location
are intentionally directed to female employees. Circumstances apart from a poster can
associate the poster with specific persons or groups within the workplace and thus direct its
message to those persons or groups. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
137 Interestingly, as I write the first draft of this subsection, Julie Foudy, member of the
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On the other hand, suppose that a viciously racist supervisor or coworker
entertains himself by generally displaying a poster at his worksite glorifying Ku
Klux Klan lynchings of African-Americans under the caption: "America's Final
Solution." Although other employees of all backgrounds presumably would be
greatly offended by such an outrageous display, one can imagine that African-
American employees would be affected to a different degree than would other
employees. It is conceivable, for example, that African-Americans would make
up 80% of the employees who were so scandalized by the poster that they
found working conditions intolerable, even though only 20% of the employees
exposed to the poster were African-American. 138 An outrageous display
glorifying Nazi persecution of Jews or the sexual abuse of women might have a
similarly disparate impact on employees on the basis of protected classifications
such as race, religion, and gender.
These examples illustrate that the content of the expression is crucial to the
disparate impact analysis: liability under Title VII on a disparate impact theory
for undirected speech is more likely to be triggered by neo-Nazi, violently
misogynist, or Ku Klux Klan propaganda than by NBA posters. The content-
1996 Summer Olympics gold-medal winning U.S. Women's Soccer Team, has stated in an
interview that she was a Los Angeles Lakers fan as a youth and displayed a poster of Kareem
Abduhl Jabar in her room. Talk Back Live (CNN television broadcast, Aug. 2, 1996).
138 It may be regrettable that members of our society might not be equally outraged by
such a racist display and that "race... is so incendiary an issue, [but] until the Nation
matures beyond that condition," our history of discrimination and violence may cause
members of the group addressed by the bigoted expression to feel the sting more sharply than
would even the least bigoted members of other groups. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S.
377, 433 n.9 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring) (commenting on the likelihood that racist
fighting words could present a particularly great danger of injury or violence).
For example, in a recent article I explained how African-American students reacted
more strongly to racist interet speech introduced in an English class for good-faith pedagogic
purposes:
They also explained why the handout of racist speech was particularly harmful to
African-American students. Already under a spotlight because they are so few in number
in most classes, African-American students would feel particularly painful scrutiny when
the class is asked to address horrible racist speech directed almost entirely at their race.
What might be a challenging or provocative assignment for other students might be
nearly unbearable for African-American students in those circumstances. The "jokes"
struck the students as particularly pernicious classroom material, because they
masqueraded as harmless jest and thus might actually be accepted and repeated by
insensitive students outside of class.
Charles R. Calleros, Conflict, Apology, and Reconciliation at Arizona State University: A
Second Case Study in Hatefid Speech, 27 CuvBERLAND L. REv. 91, 110 (1997).
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orientation of such regulation presumably threatens First Amendment values to
a greater degree than would the largely content-neutral regulation of speech that
is intentionally and selectively directed to members of a protected class. 139
One could attempt to avoid heightened constitutional scrutiny for public
workplace displays by finding an intent to selectively target members of a
protected class for intimidation, perhaps by inferring such an intent from the
simple act of displaying bigoted expression such as neo-Nazi, Ku Klux Klan, or
violently misogynist propaganda. In the discussion below, however, I assume
that liability is based on a content-oriented disparate impact theory, and I
discuss First Amendment limitations on such regulation.
2. Content-Oriented Regulation
Even outrageously hurtful speech, such as Nazi propoganda or the
hypothetical Ku Klux Klan poster described in discussion above, arguably
expresses social or political views,14° however misguided, and generally would
be constitutionally protected if expressed in a public forum. 141 Assuming that
the disparate impact theory described above regulates such speech on the basis
of its content, it is "presumptively invalid." 142 Compared to the more relaxed
scrutiny of Title VII's content-neutral regulation, such disparate impact liability
normally should satisfy First Amendment concerns only if it is more narrowly
tailored to satisfy a compelling government interest. 143
139 See, e.g., R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 377. In R.A.V., selective regulation of bigoted
fighting words presumably would not have been saved by the argument that fighting words of
such content had a disparate impact on minorities and thus that the regulation was a form of
protecting potential victims against selective targeting. In dictum, the Court referred to the
facial validity of a law that selectively regulated fighting words of any content that are
directed to persons because of their membership in a properly defined protected class;
however, it did not mention the possibility that such discriminatory targeting could be found
in the disparate impact of the expression. See id. at 392.
140 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, 60 U. Cu. L. REv. 795, 796,
813-15 (1993). Sunstein argues that racially bigoted speech is more deserving of
constitutional protection than is simple pornography, because much of it is part of social
deliberation. See id. at 813.
141 See, e.g., Collin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 67 (N.D. M11. 978), aff'd in part, 578 F.2d
1197 (7th Cir. 1978), stay denied sub nom., Smith v. Collin, 436 U.S. 953 (1978); Village of
Skokie v. National Socialist Party, 373 N.E.2d 21 (Ill. 1978).
14 2 R.A.., 505 U.S. at 382 ("Content-based regulations are presumptively invalid.").
But cf Fallon, supra note 46, at 21-35 (describing weaknesses in the justification for a
general commitment to a rule of content neutrality).
143 See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 197 (1992); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New
York Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 106 (1991); see also R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 395
(analyzing the city's contention that its ordinance "is narrowly tailored to serve compelling
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The workplace, however, is a forum in which interests in protecting public
discourse and the speakers' autonomy and dignity should be moderated in
recognition of government interests in equal employment opportunities, 144 and
in protecting the autonomy and dignity of unwilling listeners' 45 who cannot
retreat into their homes during working hours. 146 In this context, the
presumption of invalidity of the content-oriented regulation should be more
easily rebutted than in the case of content-oriented regulation of speech in a
public forum. At least with respect to the classifications protected by Title VII
for which the government has a compelling interest in eradicating
discrimination, 147 workplace expression that has a discriminatory impact should
be constitutionally proscribable under carefully crafted rules, rules that are
narrowly tailored to the objective of ensuring working conditions that do not
discriminatorily drive employees from their jobs or make their work
substantially more difficult.
Although the First Amendment will require a close fit between content-
oriented regulation of workplace speech and the government goal of preserving
equal employment opportunity, it should not demand the "most exacting
scrutiny" reserved for regulation of the content of political speech in a public
forum.148 The same factors discussed in Part II above regarding regulation of
selectively directed speech can apply to regulation based on disparate impact.
Nonetheless, constitutional values demand that a content-oriented hostile
environment theory based on disparate impact be significantly more narrowly
circumscribed than a content-neutral regulation based on selectively directed
speech. Accordingly, liability for the disparate impact of pure speech in the
workplace should be limited to cases in which discrimination through disparate
impact is clearly shown, a substantial adverse effect of the speech on working
conditions is established under a properly formulated objective standard,
implied consent is clearly absent, and recipients of the speech are captive in the
sense that they have no feasible way to "avert their eyes." Even then, the
resulting standard must withstand special scrutiny for vagueness problems,
partly grounded in the due process requirement of notice, as discussed in Part
IV below.
state interests").
144 See supra notes 10-30 and accompanying text.
145 See Kamer, supra note 17, at 675-76.
146 See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
147 See supra note 30 and accompanying text. This Article assumes such a compelling
interest at least for the classifications of race and sex, which probably define the groups most
commonly disproportionately affected by outrageous posters in the workplace.
148 Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992) ("exacting scrutiny"); Boos v. Barry,
485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) ("the most exacting scrutiny").
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a. Discrimination Through Disparate Impact
The difficulty of establishing disparate impact from undirected expression
should not be underestimated. When the discriminatory environment is based
primarily on the disparate impact of pure speech, the First Amendment should
restrict the regulation to that which is absolutely necessary to achieve the
governmental interest in remedying workplace discrimination. Consistent with
those values and with equity principles underlying Title VII, a showing of such
disparate impact should be based not on stereotyped assumptions about the
sensibilities of members of a protected group, but rather on a particularized
factual showing in each case.
It is one thing to establish objective, physically verifiable facts about the
relative proportions of male and female members of a labor pool who can meet
a height requirement. 149 It is quite another matter to establish with objective
facts that members of a worksite reacted differently to a generally displayed
poster or similar expression largely on the basis of their membership in a
protected class, 150 rather than on the basis of personal tastes and attitudes that
cut across protected class lines. 151
149 See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 323-32 (1977) (height and weight
requirement for prison guards); Blake v. City of Los Angeles Police Dep't, 595 F.2d 1367,
1371 (9th Cir. 1979) (height requirement and physical abilities test for police officers).
150 Accepting such a disparate impact theory to establish a discriminatory work
environment arguably lends support to an objective standard of harassment based on the
perceptions of a reasonable member of the protected class suffering the discrimination.
Compare supra note 46 and accompanying text ("reasonable person standard") with infra note
157 (discussing the split in authority on question of whether "reasonable person" should be
defined with respect to reasonable persons in the group complaining of discrimination).
151 For example, suppose that two women at a worksite feel harassed by a generally
displayed poster of a scantily clad woman posed in a sexual manner. They have no strong
religious beliefs, but they are seriously distracted by the poster because it makes them feel like
objects of sexual desire rather than fully respected employees. Accordingly, they seek to
establish that the poster, although posted purely for entertainment purposes and not selectively
directed to female employees, has a disparate impact on female employees and thus
discriminates against them because of their sex.
The plaintiffs find that three other women are strongly disturbed and distracted by the
poster, largely because their shared religion frowns on public displays of nudity and sexuality.
The remaining four of the nine female employees, however, find the posters to be relatively
uninteresting and inoffensive. Two of these four find it unremarkable for their male
counterparts to display an interest in scantily clad women; the other two have posters of their
favorite male Hollywood "studs" in their own lockers, and they are not distracted by the more
public display of the female pin-ups. Conversely, of the ten men at the worksite, five find the
publicly displayed pin-up to distract them from their work for various reasons. Four of them
find that the poster offends their religious beliefs. Cf. supra note 105 (discussing examples of
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This burden of proving the disparate impact with highly specific evidence
of reactions within the relevant population is not an unfair one. The relevant
population should be viewed as the group of employees who actually were
exposed to the workplace speech, obviating the need for approximations,
estimates, or extrapolations based on surrogate populations or on samples of a
larger population, such as a local labor pool or more general population. 152
b. Altering Working Conditions as Viewed by the "Reasonable Person"
The charging party not only must show that the impact of the expression
was disparate, as in the case of directed speech, she must also establish that the
impact on the relatively severely affected group was sufficient to alter working
conditions. As with directed speech, mere offense is not sufficient, and the
expression must be "sufficiently severe or pervasive" to create "an environment
that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive," as well as one that the
victim subjectively perceives to be hostile or abusive. 153
As discussed above, the disparate nature of the impact should be
established through a cumulative analysis of the subjective reactions of
individuals exposed to the speech, and disparity should not be established unless
members of a protected class in fact subjectively experienced adverse reactions
male employees who objected to a workplace pin-up on religious grounds). The other finds
the poster to be sexually stimulating, creating what he believes to be an inappropriate
distraction from his work.
In sum, at least with respect to this particular workforce, the evidence shows no
significant disparate impact on the basis of gender, because nearly the same percentage of
men as women find the poster to be distracting. Evidence of disparate impact of similar
posters on women within a larger population might be excluded as irrelevant if reliable
evidence of impact on actual members of the affected workforce is available. The facts of this
hypothetical example raise an interesting question whether members of a particular religion
could establish a disparate impact against them.
152 . New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 598-600 (1979) (White,
J., dissenting) (outlining disagreement between dissent and majority about probative value of
statistical analysis based on the racial composition of methadone users in the general city
population in the absence of statistical analysis based on methadone users who, among other
things, "worked for or sought to work for" the employer); Dothard, 433 U.S. at 330
(accepting a showing of disproportionate impact based on "generalized national statistics" and
noting the difficulty in some contexts of identifying "the actual potential applicant pool");
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 & n.13 (1977) (expressing
how the liability for pattern and practice of discrimination could be based on disproportionate
impact on qualified members of a protected class in the relevant labor market, although data
on actual applicant pool, if available, would be highly relevant).
153 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993); see also supra notes 45 and
46 and accompanying text.
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in disproportion to their numbers in the workforce. Moreover, unlike in cases
in which the impact of a challenged policy is complete exclusion from the
workforce, 154 liability for a discriminatory work environment must rest on a
further finding that the complainant's working conditions have degraded to a
certain degree. 155 This requires a showing both that the complainant was one of
those who subjectively felt the requisite adverse impact and that a "reasonable
person" would have felt similarly.
Some courts and commentators have concluded that the Supreme Court has
not clearly foreclosed the question of the breadth of the population with
reference to which the "reasonable person" should be defined: 156 (1) the
general population, or (2) members of the protected class that was targeted for
directed speech or conduct, or that suffered disproportionately from undirected
speech or conduct. 157 A narrowly objective test based on a reasonable member
of the protected class whose members suffer a relatively great impact
presumably would lead to liability in a greater number of cases. 158
The Supreme Court, however, referred to an objective test based on a
"reasonable person," rather than a "reasonable woman" or other member of a
protected class. 159 If formulated properly, such a test provides the best tool with
154 See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 427-28 (1971) (analyzing high
school diploma and standardized intelligence test scores as entrance requirements to power
plant).
155 Discrimination and alteration of conditions of employment are cumulative requisites
of Title VII liability that form distinct issues. See, e.g., Calleros, Title VII and Free Speech,
supra note 1, at 229 and nn.19-20.
156 See, e.g., GREENAWALT, supra note 10, at 79; Karner, supra note 17, at 643.
157 See KaMer, supra note 17, at 643 (reviewing split in federal appellate courts in sex
discrimination cases over whether to use an objective test based on a "reasonable woman" or
on a "reasonable person" without regard to gender); Agency Rulings, EEOC Harassment
Guidelines Refer to Reasonable Person, 62 U.S.L.W. 2061, 2061-62 (Aug. 3, 1993)
(summarizing the conflict); see also Duplessis v. Training & Dev. Corp., 835 F. Supp. 671,
677 (D. Me. 1993) (adopting "reasonable Franco-American" test for national origin
harassment). Commentators are similarly split. Compare, e.g., Walter Christopher Arbery,
Note, A Step Backward for Equality Principles: The "Reasonable Woman" Standard in Title
VII Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment Claims, 27 GA. L. REv. 503, 539 (1993)
with Fallon, supra note 46, at 46 (advocating the reasonable woman test and concluding that it
"should survive First Amendment scrutiny").
158 Still, liability would not follow automatically from every differential effect. For
example, a complainant might show that a poster negatively affected the working conditions
of 33% of female employees exposed to the poster but only 2% of male employees similarly
exposed; nonetheless, 67% of female employees did not suffer an impact sufficiently great to
alter their working conditions, suggesting that a "reasonable woman," as well as a
"reasonable person," might not feel alteration of workplace conditions.
159 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).
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which to constrain a content-oriented disparate impact theory within the limits
demanded by the First Amendment while still promoting the policies of Title
VII. Accordingly, this Article will proceed on the assumption that a
discriminatory work environment theory of liability includes an objective
element based on the sensibilities of a "reasonable person" in the general
population.
Such a broadly objective test still leaves open substantial questions about its
precise formulation. For example, in a society almost equally divided between
men and women, what perspective would be held by a "reasonable person" on
a matter about which men and women typically have had vastly different
experiences? 160 The relative merits of alternative formulations of such a
standard may be clearer after exploring the possible differences between an
objective standard based on a reasonable person in the general population and
one based on a reasonable member of a protected class.
Regardless of how it is formulated, even a broadly objective standard will
permit liability for a discriminatory work environment based on disparate
impact in at least two kinds of cases. First, disparate impact will be found in
those cases in which a "reasonable person" in the population as a whole would
find an alteration of conditions of employment, even though a majority of
employees in the workplace are bigoted or insensitive and feel that their
working conditions are unaffected. 161 Second, it will be found in those cases in
which conditions of employment have been altered for all employees but to a
much greater degree for members of a protected class. 162
160 Of course, one should not underestimate the comparable difficulties of arriving at the
perspective of a "reasonable woman" in a diverse population of women who concededily
share some experiences, but who are sufficiently independent-minded and have a wide range
of views and values on topics ranging from abortion to pornography.
161 In such a case, a "reasonable person" in the general population would find the work
environment to be hostile, supporting a finding that conditions of employment were altered.
Moreover, because a majority of the employees at the actual worksite did not find their
conditions of employment to be adversely altered, the adverse effect on members of a
minority group in the workplace may be disproportionate.
162 For example, the poster described in the text glorifying Ku Klux Klan lynchings of
African-Americans might disturb almost all employees so as to make it substantially harder
for them to perform their work. However, African-Americans might be disproportionately
represented in the group of employees who are so profoundly affected that they feel
compelled to quit their jobs when the employer refuses their requests to remove the poster. In
such a case, African-Americans would be the victims of discrimination in the form of
disparate impact, because they are affected to a greater degree in disproportionate numbers.
Moreover, to the extent that the majority of employees at the worksite are an accurate
indicator of the sensibilities of a "reasonable person" in the general population, the broadly
objective standard for hostile environment harassment would be satisfied.
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In other contexts, however, depending on how a "reasonable person"
standard is formulated and applied, it could foreclose liability even though
expression has a disparate impact on employees. In some cases the impact will
be disparate precisely because a majority of employees are able to function
normally in the face of speech or conduct that a protected minority finds to be
greatly disturbing. 163 In such cases, if the sensibilities of the majority of
employees reflect those of the majority of the population as a whole, a broadly
objective standard based on such majority sensibilities would preclude liability.
Members of the protected minority group would suffer the disparate impact, but
a majority-based objective standard would lead to a finding that the disparate
impact did not degrade the working environment to the requisite degree. 164
This could occur in a workplace when the values or perspectives of members of
a protected class, such as a minority racial group, reflect different sensibilities
about the expression in question than would a "reasonable person" holding
majority sensibilities.
To some extent, such a limitation on liability is sensible. Unless spitefully
and discriminatorily directed to certain employees, a supervisor's display of a
still-life painting featuring a luscious bunch of grapes should not implicate Title
VII even though Mexican-American clerical employees have fervently united
behind a movement to boycott grapes in support of Mexican and Mexican-
American farmworkers and strongly object to a display that seems to encourage
others to be attracted to grapes. Even in the unlikely event that the boycott has
raised tensions on the topic to such a high degree that the Mexican-American
clerical workers subjectively feel a degradation of their working environment,
and even if such feelings are broadly shared in the Mexican-American
community, Title VII should not be triggered. Liability should not be imposed
on the basis of reactions that are typical or "reasonable" within the discrete
group, particularly when those reactions have been cultivated within a political
163 Some may rebel at such a notion and may maintain that various reactions to
outrageous speech normally will be spread evenly across the lines of protected classes. I make
no claim, however, about the frequency of such disparate reactions. I simply explore the
argument that plaintiffs should have the opportunity to prove such disparate impact, no matter
how difficult that burden. See supra notes 114-24 and accompanying text.
164 Suppose, for example, that the racist poster described supra note 162 was sufficiently
disturbing to alter working conditions for a large percentage of African-American employees,
but that it altered working conditions for only a small percentage of non-African-American
employees. It is not entirely clear how a "reasonable person" in the general population would
be defined in a pluralistic society; however, the definition presumably would be heavily
influenced by the majority population. Assuming that a "reasonable person" in that population
would be offended by the racist poster but would not be so disturbed that his ability to work
would be hampered, a broadly objective standard would preclude a finding of a hostile work
environment.
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or social movement.
On the other hand, a court would obviously defeat the remedial goals of
Title VII by applying a broadly objective standard that incorporates majority
prejudice toward a minority within a protected classification. For example,
when the country is gripped with rampant nativist resentment toward
immigration from Mexico, the "average" person in the general population
might condone scurrilous expressions about Mexican-Americans that employees
of Mexican origin would find to be seriously disturbing. Accordingly, even a
broadly objective standard based on a "reasonable person" must give a meaning
to "reasonable" that does more than reflect the average sensibilities within a
bigoted population.
Instead, the "reasonable person" under Title VII should be defined as an
ideal: a fictional person without race, gender, or other characteristics relating to
protected classifications. Such a "reasonable person" would behave in a manner
consistent with the terms and goals of Title VII and thus would not be inclined
to discriminate intentionally against employees. Indeed, this person would be
inclined to cease a facially neutral practice, including speech, once it became
known that the practice adversely and disproportionately affected a protected
class. Such a person would not necessarily share the experiences and special
sensitivities of members of a particular protected class, but would be aware of
those experiences and the context of alleged harassment. In other words, the
"reasonable person" would directly represent neither members of the class
victimized by the alleged harassment (such as Mexican-American employees
who have mobilized behind a grape boycott) nor the majority of workers or
persons generally (such as a population gripped with fear and bigotry
concerning immigration from Mexico). Instead, this idealized "reasonable
person" would represent a reasonably intelligent, well-informed, non-bigoted
person who is aware of the context of the alleged harassment.
Although such a hypothetical person would not direct a racial epithet at
another employee or maintain a poster that disproportionately scandalized
members of a protected class, neither would this "reasonable person"
automatically jump to the conclusion that every such incident necessarily
affected terms or conditions of employment to a sufficient degree to violate
Title VII. 165 Whether applied by judge or jury, 16 6 the "reasonable person"
standard would not represent any actual person or group so much as it would
act as a policy limitation on liability. Recognizing the inevitable and irreducible
frictions in a workplace, this standard would exclude liability when the
165 See Williams v. Prince Georges County Hosp. Ctr., 932 F. Supp. 687, 690 (D. Md.
1996) (finding bad faith in attorney's bringing Title VII action based on single racial remark).
166 The Civil Rights Act of 1991 extended the right to a jury trial in Title VII actions for
claims for damages under the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (1991).
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subjective reactions of a victim of alleged harassment are out of balance with a
reasonable accommodation of the remedial goals of Title VII.
This idealized standard seems consistent with the apparent objective of the
EEOC to strike a middle ground between a "reasonable person" who might
share majoritarian prejudices, on the one hand, and a standard based on
members of a protected class who may have been organized or conditioned to
react in a way that exaggerates the differential experiences of members of
different classes. For example, the EEOC has instructed its agents that the
"reasonable person standard should consider the victim's perspective and not
stereotyped notions of acceptable behavior," and that it should be applied with
sensitivity to context rather than in a "vacuum." 167
More recently, the EEOC proposed and then withdrew a test for
harassment that would define the "reasonable person standard" partly with
reference to "the perspective of persons of the alleged victim's race, color,
religion, gender, national origin, age, or disability." 168 Because such a standard
incorporates general knowledge of the special experiences of members of a
protected class, it may come close to merging with a standard based on a
reasonable member of the victimized class. However, it still contemplates a
neutral, critical, culturally informed judgment, rather than a simple empirical
analysis of the average reactions of members of a particular class. If such an
informed judgment is all that is meant by those who advocate a standard based
on a reasonable member of the victimized class, then perhaps the "reasonable
person" and "reasonable member of the victimized class" standards in fact
merge at the margins and can be interpreted to be consistent with the other.
Regardless of how such an interpretation of the "reasonable person"
standard would relate to other formulations, practical questions obviously would
arise about how it would be conveyed in any meaningful way to a jury and how
the standard would apply in particular cases. Nonetheless, it seems clear that
the standard would permit a finding that certain kinds of outrageous, although
undirected, displays had a disparate impact on members of a protected class and
altered their conditions of employment.
For example, consider once again the hypothetical Ku Klux Klan poster
glorifying the lynching of African-Americans as "America's Final Solution,"
and suppose that it were displayed by a racist supervisor for his own
167 EEOC Policy Guidance on Sexual Harassment, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 201, at
E-4 (Oct. 18, 1988); EEOC Policy Guidance on Current Issues of Sexual Harassment, EEOC
Compl. Man. (BNA) No. 4031 at 4045 (Mar. 19, 1990) (quoted in EEOC v. West, App.
Nos. 01942699, 93-11-0116, 1996 WL 106723, at *5 (E.E.O.C.) (Mar. 7, 1996)).
168 EEOC Guidelines on Harassment Based on Race, Color, Religion, Gender, National
Origin, Age, or Disability, 29 C.F.R. § 1609.1(b)(1), (c), proposed, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,266
(Oct. 1, 1993), withdrawn, 59 Fed. Reg. 51,396 (1994).
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entertainment in a workplace in which African-American employees were
vastly outnumbered by others. Assume also that the poster's message had a
disparate impact on the African-American employees: although it greatly
offended almost all workers, African-American employees were
disproportionately among those who were so subjectively disturbed that it
adversely affected their ability to work or their emotional well-being on the job.
An objective analysis ought to confirm the reasonableness of the subjective
reactions of the affected African-American employees without incorporating
anti-black bigotry that is inimical to the goals of Title VII and which may be
present within the general population. The idealized "reasonable person,"
aware of the employment context and the history of racial violence in this
country, might well judge such a display to violate Title VII.
c. Absence of Consent
As with liability for directed speech, liability for maintenance of a
discriminatory work environment based on the disparate impact of undirected
expression must be based on unwelcome, nonconsensual expression. Such a
limitation excludes liability for the impact of expression that is predictably part
of the legitimate job description. For example, one who voluntarily accepts a
job as a museum guard can hardly base a Title VII complaint on the impact of
predictably displayed paintings of nudes or historical photographs of Ku Klux
Klan lynchings or Nazi persecution. 169 Similarly, a secretary who agrees to
assume the task of taking meeting notes for a marketing executive cannot base a
Title VII complaint on the impact of provocative speech between marketing
executives in an uninhibited discussion of racially or sexually oriented
marketing programs.170
On the other hand, by taking a position as a mechanic, an employee should
not be viewed as automatically consenting to an outrageous poster, unrelated to
work, displayed on a common tool box. The high incidence of outrageous
expression and images in more public forums, or in places to which access is
more clearly voluntary, should not raise inferences of consent to such
expression in the workplace, where employees are compelled to spend many of
their waking hours for their economic survival. 171 Implied consent must be tied
169 See generally Fallon, supra note 46, at 50 (stating that a distributor of pornographic
materials cannot claim a hostile work environment); Volokh, Freedom of Speech and
Workplace Harassment, supra note 42, at 1861 (stating that an employee of an art gallery or
bookstore cannot claim that sexually explicit materials are creating a hostile work
environment).
170 See supra Part II (A).
171 See, e.g., Leidholdt, supra note 97, at 224-25 (criticizing reasoning of Rabidue v.
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to legitimate job requirements.' 72
d. Captive Audience of Undirected Speech
Perhaps more than any other contextual factor, the extent to which an
employee is unable to escape the disparate impact of undirected speech will
help determine whether Title VII can impose content-oriented regulation
consistent with the First Amendment. By its very nature, undirected speech is
less intrusive than is speech of the same content that is thrust upon a targeted
employee. Although undirected speech may nonetheless be so pervasive or
intense that members of the disproportionately affected class cannot ignore it,
the burden of establishing such an inability to avert one's eyes will be
substantial. Moreover, if Title VII imposed content-oriented regulation in the
absence of such a showing, it would not be serving a compelling governmental
interest in the least restrictive manner.
Suppose, for example, that a supervisor displays on the wall of his office a
calendar picturing a nude or scantily clad woman, and that he has placed on his
desk a photo of his wife in a bikini and in an alluring pose. Suppose also that
employees who enter the supervisor's office in the normal course of their work
are not compelled to look at either display, although some find themselves
drawn to the displays, and the peripheral vision of others simply reminds them
that the displays exist. An employee who raised a Title VII claim in such
circumstances would bear the significant burdens of showing not only that the
displays had a disparate impact on a protected class, 173 but also that they were
held captive to the speech and unable to escape it in a reasonable manner.
Here, the only employees who focus their attention on the displays may be
those who are voluntarily drawn to them, perhaps because they find the
displays attractive or because they feel a desire to view the displays so that they
can pass judgment on the supervisor or otherwise register their disgust. Other
employees might be generally reminded of the existence of the displays when
they enter the office, but their sense of offense or disapproval would be similar
to that of the mechanic who disapproved of her coworker's habit of viewing
Playboy magazine during his break. Although a glance in the coworker's
direction would remind her that her coworker enjoyed viewing photos that
presented women as sex objects, she would have little basis for complaining of
a Title VII violation unless the coworker, with the employer's acquiescence,
Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 618 (6th Cir. 1986)).
172 Cf Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) ("If an employment
practice which operates to exclude [members of a protected class] cannot be shown to be
related to job performance, the practice is prohibited.") (alteration in the original).
173 See supra note 124 and supra Part I (C) (2) (a).
1264 [Vol. 58:1217
TITLE VII AND THE FIRST AMENDMEAT
forced his displays upon her because of her gender or acted differently towards
her once the break was over and he returned to work. Similarly, an apparently
undirected display would not hold an employee captive to its message unless it
were displayed so pervasively or so strategically that an employee would be
compelled to view it to perform her required tasks. Such compulsion might be
shown if the supervisor had every wall and surface of his office papered with
outrageous displays, if the supervisor displayed an objectionable poster
prominently on the wall directly behind his desk so that an employee would find
it difficult to speak to the supervisor without also focusing on the poster, or if
the supervisor prohibited the employee from turning a desk photo away while
she was assigned to work at his desk. In some of these instances, of course, a
factfinder might infer that the supervisor is specifically directing the expression
to the employee. 174 Disparate impact analysis would be unnecessary if the
supervisor directed the expression in a manner that discriminatorily targeted
members of a protected class. 175
The discriminatory impact analysis might take on greater significance in the
case of aural expression, because it may be impossible for a captive employee
to shut out audible expression, even though not directed to him, and even
though he could avert his eyes from some undirected visual displays. For
example, a supervisor might invoke outrageous and intimidating anti-black
racial epithets in conversations with fellow white supervisors that are
unavoidably overheard by other employees, including African-American
employees, who are required to remain at a nearby work station and who have
no reasonable means of "shutting out" the speech. In some cases, African-
American employees might be able to establish that the supervisor in fact was
directing the epithets to them, rather than to the other supervisors, as a means
of intimidating them. Even in the absence of such an intent to discriminatorily
direct the speech, however, the African-American employees should have the
opportunity to establish the discriminatory impact of the speech and to show
that they were captives to the speech rather than consensual participants.
In sum, unless the manner of the oppressive expression permits an
174 See generally Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 n.3 (1990)
(finding that discriminatory intent may be implicit in the act of posting pornographic pictures).
175 For example, the supervisor may know that the only employee who must regularly
enter his office to speak with him is his female secretary and he might display a sexually
provocative poster directly behind his desk so that the secretary will be forced to view it.
Perhaps he wants to sexually intimidate her or perhaps he foolishly thinks that the sexual
display will stimulate her to be sexually receptive to him. In such circumstances, if he would
not have displayed the poster in such a manner had the employee who regularly visited him
been male, then he has directed the expression to his secretary on the basis of her gender.
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inference of intentional discriminatory targeting of the victims' 76 discrimination
must be based on disparate impact, which necessarily is grounded in the content
of the speech. 177 Government regulation of speech in this manner must be more
carefully circumscribed than content-neutral regulation of selectively directed
speech, but characteristics of some workplace tasks and locations should permit
some degree of regulation within the bounds of the First Amendment.
Nonetheless, any government regulation of workplace speech must address
potential objections about vagueness and overbreadth, and such objections may
be more difficult to overcome in the case of undirected speech.
IV. VAGUENESS AND OVERBREADTH
This Article has advocated content-neutral regulation of directed speech
with rules that are reasonably and narrowly tailored to the substantial, if not
compelling, governmental interests in eradicating various forms of invidious
workplace discrimination. It has also advocated content-oriented regulation of
undirected speech with rules that represent the least restrictive means of serving
the compelling interest. Assuming that this Article's accommodation of the
values of Title VII and the First Amendment is constitutionally sound, these
proposed standards for liability under Title VII still must be carefully expressed
in the law to avoid problems of overbreadth. Specifically, standards for liability
under Title VII must be narrowly defined so that they do not impose liability for
a substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech along with
constitutionally proscribable harassing speech.17 8
The difficulty of precisely defining the line between proscribable harassing
speech and constitutionally protected speech inevitably raises additional
concerns of vagueness. Excessive vagueness in the standards for regulation may
deny employers due process 179 by providing them with inadequate notice of
conduct that will invite enforcement and liability.' 80 The danger of
unpredictability and arbitrariness is underscored if vague standards invest
176 See supra notes 96-97, 174 and accompanying texts.
177 See supra notes 128-39 and accompanying text.
178 See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612-13 (1973).
179 See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572 (1974) (stating that the vagueness doctrine
rests primarily on the due process requirement of notice).
180 See Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 607 (ruling that a statute is vague if "men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning") (quoting Connally v. General Constr.
Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972)
(stating that laws must provide a person with "a reasonable opportunity to know what is
prohibited so that he may act accordingly"); Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 231-32
(1951) (stating similarly that laws must provide "sufficiently definite warning as to the
proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices").
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individual judges, juries, and EEOC enforcement officers with excessive
discretion to shape the standards according to highly variable personal
values.181 Vague standards for regulation of speech may create a "chilling
effect"'182 on protected speech by making speakers guess what kinds of speech
will trigger enforcement and thus inhibiting their expression of protected
speech.' 8 3
Kingsley Browne has argued that such impermissible vagueness infects
Title VII standards for liability for speech that creates a discriminatory work
environment. 184 Browne and Eugene Volokh are particularly concerned that
unpredictability in the enforcement of the discriminatory environment theory
will cause rational employers to overregulate the speech of their employees to
avoid costly lawsuits.18 5
As discussed earlier, Browne and Volokh prescribe different remedies
against the vagueness that they perceive in the standards for discriminatory
work environment as applied to workplace speech. Volokh would restrict
application of the theory to directed speech, while Browne would exclude
speech entirely as a basis for demonstrating degradation of working
conditions. 186
I conclude that Volokh is closer to the mark. Although undirected speech
raises special problems of vagueness and overbreadth, the challenges of
defining liability for directed speech with adequate precision are not
insurmountable. Furthermore, I conclude that even Volokh's bright line is
unnecessary and that Title VII can be constitutionally interpreted to apply to a
narrowly defined class of undirected harassing speech, as well as a more
broadly defined class of directed speech. To resolve the twin problems of
vagueness and overbreadth, this Article will embark on two final endeavors.
First, to address vagueness problems, the Article will further refine the
standards for liability. Second, it will discuss ways in which a precisely
conceived standard for liability can be expressed and applied in a way that will
181 See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108.
182 Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967) ("When one must guess
what... utterance may lose him his position, one necessarily will 'steer far wider of the
unlawful zone... .'") (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)).183 See Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instructions, 368 U.S. 278, 287 (1961).
184 Browne, supra note 7, at 501-10; see also Kamer, supra note 17, at 657-59 (current
Title VII standards are vague and overly broad); Wayne Lindsey Robbins, Jr., When Two
Liberal Values Collide in an Era of "Political Correctness ". First Amendment Protection as a
Check on Speech-Based Title VII Hostile Environment Claims, 47 BAYLOR L. REv. 789, 809-
11(1995).
185 See Browne, supra note 7, at 504-10; Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Workplace
Harassment, supra note 42, at 1808.116 See supra notes 18, 77 and accompanying text.
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address problems of both vagueness and overbreadth.
A. Refining the Standards
The challenge of confronting constitutional objections based on vagueness
can best be met by re-examining current Title VII standards and underscoring
necessary refinements. In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., the Supreme Court
reaffirmed its earlier decision that Title VII is violated "[w]hen the workplace is
permeated with 'discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult,' . . . that is
'sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's
employment and create an abusive working environment."'187 It explained that
this standard "takes a middle path between making actionable any conduct that
is merely offensive and requiring the conduct to cause a tangible psychological
injury."188
The Harris majority conceded that this test "is not, and by its nature cannot
be, a mathematically precise test"'189 and "that whether an environment is
'hostile' or 'abusive' can be determined only by looking at all the
circumstances. '" 190 The majority did provide some more concrete guidance,
however, by identifying several factors that a court might consider in
determining whether discriminatory harassment has altered conditions of
employment: "the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity;
whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive
utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work
performance."191
In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia expressed doubt mixed with
resignation:
"Abusive" (or "hostile," which in this context I take to mean the same
thing) does not seem to me a very clear standard-and I do not think clarity is
at all increased by adding the adverb "objectively" or by appealing to a
"reasonable person['s]" notion of what the vague word means. Today's
opinion does list a number of factors that contribute to abusiveness,.. . but
since it neither says how much of each is necessary (an impossible task) nor
identifies any single factor as determinative, it thereby adds little certitude. As
a practical matter, today's holding lets virtually unguided juries decide whether
sex-related conduct engaged in (or permitted by) an employer is egregious
187 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)).188 Id.
189 Id. at 22.
190 Id. at 23.
191 Id.
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enough to warrant an award of damages....
Be that as it may, I know of no alternative to the course the Court today
has taken. One of the factors mentioned in the Court's nonexhaustive list-
whether the conduct unreasonably interferes with an employee's work
performance-would, if it were made an absolute test, provide greater
guidance to juries and employers. But I see no basis for such a limitation in the
language of the statute. Accepting Meritor's interpretation of the term
"conditions of employmenf' as the law, the test is not whether work has been
impaired, but whether working conditions have been discriminatorily altered. I
know of no test more faithful to the inherently vague statutory language than
the one the Court today adopts. For these reasons, I join the opinion of the
Court. 192
Justice Scalia may be right that Title VII's reference to "conditions ... of
employment" does not clearly require interference with work performance as a
determinative factor. Nonetheless, a similar requirement may be constitutionally
compelled as a necessary means both of limiting the reach of Title VII's
regulation of speech to satisfy fundamental First Amendment concerns, and of
providing a concrete anchor to the regulatory test to minimize problems of
vagueness.
Justice Ginsburg strengthened the majority's multi-faceted test by
emphasizing interference with work as the dominant inquiry.193 An even more
useful anchor to the harassment test, however, is Justice Ginsburg's reference
to harassment that increases the difficulty of performing the job:
To show such interference, "the plaintiff need not prove that his or her
tangible productivity has declined as a result of the harassment'... It suffices
to prove that a reasonable person subjected to the discriminatory conduct would
find, as the plaintiff did, that the harassment so altered working conditions as to
"ma[k]e it more difficult to do the job." 194
Although Justice Ginsburg apparently viewed such speech or conduct as an
example of interference with work, and although the majority regarded none of
its factors as mandatory, 195 I would elevate the factor of "enhanced difficulty"
to the status of a necessary component of the test for a discriminatory work
environment. Accordingly, I argued in the predecessor to this Article that the
"hostile or abusive work environment" test should be replaced with a
"discriminatory work environment" test that focuses on whether harassment
192 Id. at 24-25 (Scalia, J., concurring) (internal reference omitted).
193 Id. at 25 (Ginsberg, J., concurring).
194 Id. at 25 (Ginsberg, J., concurring) (citations and footnote omitted) (quoting Davis v.
Monsanto Chem., 858 F.2d 345, 349 (6th Cir. 1988)).
195 See id. at 22.
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makes it "substantially more difficult" for an employee to perform her work. 196
Such a standard is more descriptive of my content-neutral theory of regulation
of directed speech, because I have argued that such speech need not have a
hostile or abusive content to alter working conditions. 197
Moreover, such a standard helps achieve the certainty advocated by Justice
Scalia within the framework adopted by the majority in Harris. Under my test,
the nonexhaustive factors listed by the majority are simply factors relevant to
the fairly narrow and precise question of whether harassing speech made it
substantially more difficult for an employee to perform her work. It might do so
by distracting or disturbing the employee to such a degree that it directly
interferes with her work, causing her productivity to decline. Or the harassment
might simply render the workplace so profoundly unpleasant by increasing the
physical and emotional burdens of reporting to work, maintaining a working
relationship with the harasser, and completing assignments on time.
Such an interpretation of the opinions in Harris certainly does not convert
the test for harassment into one of "mathematical certainty." Mathematical
certainty, however, is not required. 198 If it were, the federal statute that
criminalizes threats to the President would be struck down on the ground that
the statutory line between a proscribed threat and a permissible statement of
blunt political criticism is inevitably uncertain. 199 As noted by the First Circuit
in the context of discipline of an employee by a state school:
Of course, while we acknowledge a First Amendment right of public
school teachers to know what conduct is proscribed, we do not hold that a
school must expressly prohibit every imaginable inappropriate conduct by
teachers .... The relevant inquiry is: based on existing regulations, policies,
discussions, and other forms of communication between school administration
and teachers, was it reasonable for the school to expect the teacher to know
that her conduct was prohibited?200
The question under Title VII is whether standards of liability for
harassment can be communicated to employers through EEOC regulations and
judicial interpretations20' with sufficient clarity that employers can reasonably
be expected to recognize unlawful practices. The courts and the EEOC have
196 Calleros, Title Vii and Free Speech, supra note 1, at 257-58.
197 See id. at 258.
198 See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972).
199 See generally Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (holding law
prohibiting threats against the President is constitutional but did not apply to woman's
statement of wishing that the President were dead).
200 Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448,454 (lst Cir. 1993).
201 See infra Part IV (B).
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made substantial progress in this process by (1) applying an objective, as well
as a subjective, test for alteration of conditions of employment, (2) ruling out
mere offensiveness as a basis for liability, (3) requiring proof of unwelcomeness
of harassing speech and conduct, and (4) imposing liability on employers for
alteration of working conditions only when the harassing party is an agent to
whom the employer has delegated substantial responsibility or when the
employer has notice of the harassment or the potential for harassment and has
not reacted appropriately. 202
As a means of protecting First Amendment interests when proof of a
discriminatory environment is based primarily on harassing speech, courts
should add the following factors developed in this Article to the limitations and
factors advanced in Harris: the extent to which (1) participation in a vigorous
exchange of ideas is beyond the employee's job description, (2) the speech
tends toward low value speech, such as threats, rather than toward core political
speech, and (3) the target of the speech is an unwilling and captive audience. 203
Of course, even as these factors limit the reach of Title VII to guard against
overbreadth, they arguably add to vagueness concerns by underscoring the
flexible, contextual nature of the inquiry. Accordingly, I address the vagueness
problem more specifically below in separate analyses of directed speech and
undirected speech.
First, however, a quick response is in order to some commentators who
have complained that an individual harasser may lack an adequate basis for
recognizing that his actions are combining with those of others to create a
cumulative effect that alters conditions of employment. 204 This complaint
carries little weight. In the event that a court imposes personal liability on an
individual harasser,205 it presumably will do so only if that individual's actions
were independently sufficient to alter working conditions, if he acted jointly
with other harassers, or if he at least had notice of other harassment and thus
was aware that his personal contribution to a degrading environment could push
it past permissible limits. In the more likely event that the employer is held
liable for the combined actions of its supervisors or for the combined actions of
lower-level employees of which it had notice, the employer has little reason to
complain of unfairness. It is not unreasonable for an employer to take
responsibility for the combined actions of its supervisors, to whom it has
202 See supra notes 35, 45-47 and accompanying texts.
203 See supra Part II.
204 See, e.g., Robbins, supra note 184, at 810 ("[A] hostile work environment comes
from cumulative expressions, some of which may be unknown to the present speaker.");
Eugene Volokh, What Speech Does "Hostile Work Environment" Harassment Law Restrict?,
85 GEo. L.J. 627, 638-46 (1997) (analyzing "The Law's Effect on Individual Statements").
205 See supra note 36.
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delegated authority and whom it may require to attend training programs and
follow policies. Moreover, whenever the employer receives notice that any
employee has begun to degrade the environment of a coworker, it is not
unreasonable to expect the employer to reiterate its policies to all who might be
in a position to further degrade the working environment. In any event, even
after cumulative acts of harassment have altered conditions of employment, an
employer can still avoid liability in many cases by promptly taking appropriate
remedial steps. 206
1. Directed Speech
Problems of vagueness are minimal in the content-neutral regulation of
directed speech that I have advocated in the predecessor to this Article and in
Parts I and II of this Article. The primary basis for such liability is the harassing
party's selection of one or more victims on the basis of their membership in a
protected class. 207 Although questions about whether the harassing conduct is
sufficiently severe to alter conditions of employment may lead to uncertainty in
close cases, such uncertainty can easily be avoided by one who refrains from
intentionally targeting employees for abuse on the basis of protected
classifications.
Thus, if a supervisor singles out a female employee for verbal flirtation
because of her gender, and if he receives notice that the flirtations are
unwelcome, it should not be constitutionally unreasonable to expect the
supervisor to cease the discriminatory behavior, regardless of whether the line
between trivial distractions and alteration of working conditions is crystal clear.
The discriminatory and unwelcome nature of the speech will not be in doubt,
and minor "overregulation" by employers will not implicate important First
Amendment values.
For example, suppose that an employer who is anxious to avoid liability
instructs its supervisors to avoid invidious discrimination when addressing
employees, and in particular, to cease nontrivial and selectively targeted
communications if the employee recipient objects. Whether such
communications in fact violate Title VII and lie outside the protection of the
First Amendment will depend on the contextual factors discussed in this Article,
including the degree of captivity of the audience and the intrusiveness or
intimidating nature of the speech. The employer's policy, however, is designed
to steer clear of liability. Therefore, its expansive prohibition of discriminatory
and unwelcome speech that is "nontrivial" might cause a supervisor to cease
206 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 26, at 412; see also supra note 35 and accompanying
text.
207 See Calleros, Title VII and Free Speech, supra note 1, at 255.
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making unwelcome remarks about the dress and physical appearance of an
employee because of her gender, even though a reasonable person might not
find the comments sufficiently objectionable to alter working conditions.
The chilling effect caused by indeterminacy in this facet of the standard for
liability, however, would not be significant in light of the certainty about the
discriminatory and unwelcome nature of the speech. Even relatively harmless
speech directed to a relatively noncaptive employee does not further First
Amendment interests when imposed on an unwilling listener in a discriminatory
fashion. The goals of promoting democratic self-government and the search for
truth208 can be furthered adequately by speech that is directed to willing
listeners without regard to their membership in protected classes. True, a
supervisor might view it as an exercise in autonomy209 to voice his views to
selectively targeted, unwilling listeners; however, his interest in individual
autonomy and dignity is no greater than the listener's interest in preserving her
own autonomy and dignity from attack by unwelcome remarks directed toward
her because of her race or sex.
In sum, once an employee engages in the act of selectively targeting
another employee on the basis of a protected classification, and once he learns
that his selectively directed communications are unwelcome, repetition of this
behavior will in most cases warrant regulation on the basis of these factors
alone. Nonetheless, some selectively targeted and subjectively unwelcome
speech will merit constitutional protection, underscoring the need for precise
articulation of the relevant factors, as discussed below. Finally, if inevitable
indeterminacy in cases at the margin causes some employers to instruct
supervisors to avoid the gray edges of the factors that are less certain than
selective targeting and unwelcomeness, the effect on protected expression
should be insufficient to void the statute for vagueness. The same ideas can be
freely expressed to willing listeners, or at least to listeners who have not been
discriminatorily selected because of their membership in a protected class.
2. Undirected Speech
Undirected speech, such as posters displayed for the owner's own
entertainment or conversations among willing speakers that are overheard by
others, presents a -much more serious problem of vagueness. As discussed in
208 See, e.g., EMERSON, supra note 20, at 6-7 ("[Freedom of expression is an essential
process for advancing kmowledge and discovering truth [and] ... is essential to provide for
participation in decision making by all members of society.") (alteration in original).
2 09 See id. at 6 ("[F9reedom of expression is essential as a means of assuring individual
self-fulfillment [and] suppression of... expression is an affront to the dignity of
Man .. . .
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Part I, liability for such speech under Title VII must rest on the disparate
impact of the undirected speech, normally based largely on the content of the
speech. Although the plaintiffs burden of proving the disparate impact and the
inability to avert her eyes will be heavy, so too will a speaker bear the difficult
burden of predicting which content in undirected speech will alter conditions of
employment on the basis of its disparate impact.
In contrast to the case of directed speech, the speaker here is not put to the
alternatives of risking triggering liability or simply eliminating the
discriminatory targeting of his audiences. Instead, in close cases he faces the
alternatives of risking liability or removing his speech from public view
altogether. Although some employees might safely enjoy their expression of
choice by posting it in some private space, such as a locker or desk drawer,
others will not have that option.
Thus, even though I have proposed standards in Part III that preliminarily
define constitutionally permissible regulation of undirected speech,
indeterminacy in those standards will have a more direct effect on fundamental
First Amendment values than does uncertainty in the standards of liability for
directed speech. Speakers who are confused about their rights and duties will be
forced to make judgments about the content of their speech rather than simply
about their act of intentionally targeting audiences in a discriminatory fashion.
For these reasons, Title VII should be interpreted to reach only that
undirected speech which is obviously discriminatory, severely disturbing, and
unavoidably and pervasively within the view of unwilling audiences. Although
such a strict standard still does not eliminate close cases, at least it ensures that
all speech at the margin of the standard is speech that clearly could be
constitutionally proscribed, and it allows ample breathing space for all but the
most outrageous forms of expression.
For example, such a standard normally would not impose liability for
nonobscene and nonviolent depictions of nudity because of the difficulty of
predicting the discriminatory nature of the impact and its effect on working
conditions. On the other hand, a poster graphically glorifying Hitler's "final
solution," Ku Klux Klan lynchings of African-Americans, or the violent
murder-rape of women might justify imposing liability. Assuming that
nonconsensual viewers are not in a position to avert their eyes, no rational
person could fail to predict that such outrageous speech could
disproportionately affect members of the group victimized in the posters and
that the speech could so disturb or distract such employees as to affect their
ability to perform their jobs.210 Although such displays might in some
210 Cy. Wilson v. U.S. West Communications, Inc., 860 F. Supp. 665 (D. Neb. 1994).
The Wilson court found that an employer could discharge an employee who insisted on
wearing a button depicting a fetus and the words "Stop Abortion" in the workplace. See id. at
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circumstances be viewed as political speech that would warrant substantial
protection in a public forum, it warrants no such status among captive
audiences who are trying to perform their jobs.
The questions of whether such speech satisfies this demanding standard of
outrageousness may be nearly as uncertain as the question of whether a
stomach-turning photograph is obscene and therefore loses First Amendment
protection under the Miller standards.211 Nonetheless, the Court has lived with
such vagueness in obscenity cases,212 and the steps outlined below are bound to
make the disparate impact standard substantially more definite than the
obscenity standard. Moreover, under this cautious standard for disparate impact
liability, even if employers are left guessing at the boundaries of regulation in
cases at the margin, any speech that is suppressed by an employer's over-
regulation likely would be speech that would not warrant First Amendment
protection among captive workers in any event.
B. Expressing the Standards
Assuming that I have successfully defined standards that accommodate the
goals of Title VII and the First Amendment, these standards must be stated with
sufficient authority, precision, and consistency to provide employers with
reasonable notice of their content213 and to minimize the risk that juries, trial
judges, and EEOC enforcement officers will apply them too broadly. 214 Absent
676. The issue was not whether Title VII required the employer to stop the offending speech,
but whether the employer had failed to reasonably accommodate the employee's Roman
Catholic religious beliefs. See id. at 674-75. Nonetheless, the facts are instructive because the
button so distressed coworkers that it caused their productivity to decline. See id. at 669. If
the distressed coworkers complained that the button discriminatorily altered their working
conditions, my standards likely would not impose liability. Assuming that the button was not
selectively targeted at coworkers because of their membership in a protected class, and thus
constituted undirected speech, it is unlikely that it would have a significant disproportionate
impact on a protected class. Reactions to the button likely would be related to social and
political beliefs that largely cut across class lines. In the rare event that a disparate impact
could be shown in these circumstances, such proof would be surprising and difficult for an
employer to predict. Accordingly, to minimize problems of vagueness and lack of notice, my
approach would call for a restrictive statutory interpretation and application that would lead to
a finding of no Title VII violation in such circumstances.
211 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (obscenity standards).
212 See, e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecom. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374,
2389-90 (1996); cf Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 103 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (concluding that the "concept of 'obscenity' cannot be defined with sufficient
specificity and clarity").
213 See supra note 180.
214 See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
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the unlikely event of a statutory amendment that specifically addresses liability
for maintenance of a discriminatory environment, the best vehicles for
conveying specific standards to lower courts and to employers' counsel are
EEOC regulations and appellate judicial opinions.
To squarely address the constitutional limitations on regulation of speech in
the workplace, the EEOC should adopt guidelines that clearly explain that
directed harassing speech is discriminatory not on the basis of its content, but
on the basis of the speaker's selectively targeting the victims of his harassment
because of their membership in a protected class.215 The EEOC guidelines
should also interpret Title VII to leave undirected speech unregulated except in
the clearest cases of outrageous expression which disproportionately and
profoundly affect members of a protected class.
To convey these standards as precisely as possible, the EEOC should
carefully draft a series of examples and illustrations for publication in its
regulations or policy manuals. Although the illustrations obviously cannot
address every potential borderline case and provide guidance about its
resolution under Title VII, they can help add flesh to the abstract skeleton of a
multi-faceted test that is sensitive to context. Such an approach has worked well
to help campus administrators and others at Arizona State University
understand the interplay between the First Amendment and the University's
anti-harassment policies,216 and they should be equally helpful in administering
Title VII if carefully drafted.217
Appellate courts can help reduce the vagueness of general standards in
three ways. First, appellate courts can give judicial imprimatur to the EEOC
guidelines and illustrations that they find worthy of judicial adoption. Second,
they can add further definition to their general judicial standards for liability
based on maintenance of a discriminatory work environment. Third, appellate
courts can incrementally add predictability and consistency to applications of
the standard by reviewing individual lower court dispositions in Title VII
litigation.218
215 See Calleros, Title VII and Free Speech, supra note 1, at 261 nn. 200-01 and
accompanying text.
216 See, e.g., Calleros, Reconciliation, supra note 26, app. B at 1319-33 (discussing
First Amendment guidelines which interpret A.S.U.'s anti-harassment policy and include
illustrations to provide more concrete definition to the policy).
217 The drafting of suggested EEOC regulations and illustrations is a task best left to a
future article.
218 The process of adding clarity to a statutory standard through judicial
interpretation of otherwise vague statutory language was recently reaffirmed in United
States v. Lanier, 117 S. Ct. 1219 (1997). InLanier, the Sixth Circuit, sitting en bane,
had reversed a state official's criminal conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 242 for depriving
women of their liberty interests without due process by sexually assaulting them. See
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The Supreme Court can continue the process of refining its test for
alteration of working conditions by adopting the label "discriminatory work
environment" to emphasize that liability is based more on discriminatory
targeting than on the hostile or abusive content of speech.219 It also should
synthesize the majority and the two concurring opinions in Harris by requiring
proof, on the basis of the Harris factors and other contextual facts, that
harassment has altered conditions of employment by making it more difficult
for the victim to perform her job.220
Unfortunately, a major obstacle potentially lies in the way of judicial
refinement of the standard of liability through appellate review of ultimate
dispositions in individual cases. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) provides
that a federal trial court's findings of fact in a nonjury trial "shall not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous," 221 and the Supreme Court held in Pullman
Standard v. Swint that a trial judge's finding of the presence or absence of
discriminatory intent in a Title VII suit is "a pure question of fact, subject to
Rule 52's clearly erroneous standard. '222 Moreover, appellate review of jury
United States v. Lanier, 73 F. 3d 1380 (6th Cir. 1995). The Court of Appeals held that
the defendant had not received adequate notice that his conduct violated any
constitutional right incorporated into the federal criminal statute because the Supreme
Court had not previously defined the asserted due process right"in a factual situation
fundamentally similar to the one at bar." Id. at 1393.
On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded to allow the Court of Appeals
to apply a less stringent standard for finding that a defendant had fair warning that vague
statutory language prohibited particular conduct. See 117 S. Ct. at 1228. Specifically,
the Supreme Court held that fair warning under the criminal statute could be satisfied
under the standards that applied to its civil counterpart, qualified immunity for state
officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: the right said to be violated must have been "clearly
established" by precedent either of the Supreme Court or other courts, and not
necessarily on "fundamentally similar" facts. Id. at 1226-27. Even "general statements
of the law" in precedent may suffice if their application to the conduct in the case at bar
is obvious. Id. at 1227-28. Similarly, pronouncements by the EEOC and the federal
courts of appeal could clearly establish parameters of Title VII liability for
discriminatory work environments, thus providing adequate notice to employers, at least
with respect to the contexts addressed by the pronouncements or to the conduct so
extreme as to obviously trigger liability.
219 See Calleros, Title VII and Free Speech, supra note 1, at nn. 189-95 and
accompanying text.
220 See supra notes 186-98 and accompanying text.
221 "In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory
jury.... [fjindings of fact ... shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses."
Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
222 456 U.S. 273, 287-88 (1982).
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findings in a Title VII suit223 are subject to review only for confirmation that
the findings are supported by substantial evidence224 or that the findings could
be found by a reasonable jury225-a standard of review that is even more
restrictive than the clearly erroneous standard.226
In Swint, however, the Supreme Court expressly reserved the question
whether Rule 52(a) restricts review of a trial court's resolution of a "mixed
question of law and fact," which requires the application of a legal rule to
facts.227 In a previous article, I argued that trial court resolutions of such
questions, if defined as follows, should be freely reviewable on appeal:
A mixed finding of law and fact should be defined as a finding that
requires the refinement or interpretation of a legal rule in the application of that
rule to findings of fact. That characteristic is presented if the historical facts are
clear, and if the rule of law, although "undisputed" in its abstract formulation,
is technical, uncertain, or bound up with sensitive matters of social or political
policy. Appellate courts are competent to review such findings broadly, and
broad review will further the appellate courts' institutional function as well as
their corrective function. Those findings should be reviewed free of the
restrictions of Rule 52(a).228
I concluded that a "trial court's application of its legal definition of
discriminatory intent to the facts should be characterized as a mixed question of
law and fact" that is freely reviewable on appeal229 if the legal definition
addresses a novel issue and "may lack definiteness or may require particular
sensitivity to broad social values in its application to historical facts." 230 Under
this approach, for example, a "trial judge's ultimate determination whether the
plaintiff has established a prima facie case, or whether the defendant has
rebutted the presumption created by a prima facie case," should be freely
reviewable as a mixed question of law and fact because it "often requires the
223 Amendments to Title VII added by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 authorize jury trials.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c).224 See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Kepler, 116 F.2d 1, 4 & n.1 (8th Cir. 1941).
225 See, e.g., MacArthur v. University of Tex. Health Ctr., 45 F.3d 890, 896 (5th Cir.
1995).226 See Charles Richard Calleros, Title VII and Rule 52(a): Standards of Appellate
Review in Disparate Treatment Cases-Limiting the Reach of Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 58
TuL. L. REv. 403, 411 n.40 (1983) [hereinafter Calleros, Title VII and Rule 52(a)] (citing to
cases and other authorities).
227 Swim, 456 U.S. at 289 & n.19.
228 Calleros, Title VII and Rule 52(a), supra note 226, at 425 (footnotes omitted).
229 Id. at 437-38.
230 Id. at 437.
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application of technical legal standards to the findings of historical fact." 231
Professor Volokh has carried this approach further by arguing persuasively
that a disposition of an employer's First Amendment defense in a Title VII case
should be treated as a mixed finding of fact and law that is freely reviewable on
appeal. 232 Specifically, Volokh asserted that "[w]hen a factfinder concludes that
someone's speech has created a hostile environment, an appellate court is
constitutionally bound to exercise its independent judgment on this point."233
To trigger unrestricted appellate review, defense attorneys should raise a
First Amendment defense2 34 by motion to the judge, who should rule on the
defense without the jury as a mixed question of fact and law that is freely
reviewable on appeal. Alternatively, appellate courts can review special
verdicts of juries that reveal the application of legal standards implicating First
Amendment values. 235 In this way, appellate courts can enhance consistency in
lower court evaluations of some claims of discriminatory work environments,
adding to predictability and minimizing problems of vagueness.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article and its predecessor have steered a middle course between fully
invoking the First Amendment to gut Title VII's discriminatory work
environment theory and cavalierly denying any significant First Amendment
interests in the workplace. The result is a contextual approach that permits
substantial regulation of directed harassing speech and greatly restrained
regulation of undirected speech. Problems of vagueness are nontrivial but can
be adequately addressed with some cautious refinements of the legal standards
and with procedures that permit the EEOC and appellate courts to add concrete
definition to the framework of the legal standards.
231 Id. at 440--41.
232 See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Appellate Review in Worlplace
Harassment Cases, 90 N.W. UNIv. L. REv. 1009, 1018-31 (1996).
233 Id. at 1010.
234 See id. at 1029-30 ("Defense lawyers in harassment cases involving speech must
begin to raise a free speech defense because such a defense will trigger independent judgment
review, and thus give the defendant a second chance on appeal.") (foomotes omitted).
235 See id. at 1028-29.
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